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Before the Jurisprudential Turn:  Corbin and the 





Jurisprudential views are sometimes thought to affect case 
outcomes. Many commentators and some courts believe that Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 illustrates the point. Erie holds that 
federal courts generally must follow state decisional or statutory 
law except when inconsistent with constitutional law or federal 
statute. Legal positivism is a jurisprudential thesis about the nature 
of law. In its general form, the thesis asserts that law is explained 
in terms of social facts. Justice Brandeis’s majority opinion in Erie 
recites a classical conception of legal positivism, according to 
which law consists only of the authoritative declarations of a 
jurisdiction’s courts or legislature. It concludes that, subject to 
constitutional and federal statutory constraints, federal courts must 
apply state law as declared by state courts. Thus, the opinion itself 
suggests that this conclusion relies on a particular conception of 
law: legal positivism. It suggests that jurisprudence matters to 
Erie’s reasoning and outcome. 
The suggested connection between legal positivism and 
Erie’s holding represents the “jurisprudential turn”2 in 
                                                
*Percy Brown Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. 
I thank Barry Cushman, Alice de Soto, John Harrison, Alan Michaels, Keith 
Muller, Caleb Nelson, Dale Oesterle, George Rutherglen, Richard Scarberry, 
Malcolm Soames, Joshua Steinberg, Peter Swire, Joel Thomas, Mary Turner, G. 
Edward White, and audiences at the Ohio State University School of Law and 
the University of Virginia School of Law for helpful comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
2 The phrase “the jurisprudential turn” refers to the view that the resolution of 
legal issues requires taking a position on one or more jurisprudential questions. 
It describes a general methodological position within jurisprudence. The 
jurisprudential turn in the understanding of Erie’s holding that federal courts 
must apply state law, absent federal constitutional or statutory law, is limited to 
a specific legal issue. It is the position that Erie’s holding requires adopting a 
particular conception of the nature of law. Obviously it is possible to take the 
jurisprudential turn in understanding Erie without endorsing the “turn” as a 
general methodological view that the resolution of all important legal issues 
requires taking jurisprudential positions on one or more matters.  
The phrase, “the jurisprudential view,” is a variant on the phrase, “the 
linguistic turn,” apparently coined by Gustav Bergman. See GUSTAV BERGMAN, 
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understanding Erie. Courts and commentators tend to read Erie’s 
result as depending on a commitment to a particular conception of 
the nature of law.3 With or without careful qualification, they 
frequently understand the case in this way. Consult a civil 
procedure casebook today and you are likely to find Erie described 
as endorsing a particular conception of the nature of law: legal 
positivism.4 The case is variously described as “reflecting two 
jurisprudential trends of its era—realism and positivism,”5 
“represent[ing] . . . a fundamentally different view of the nature of 
law”6 from the view endorsed by Swift v. Tyson,7 and rejecting 
nonpositivism as “jurisprudentially bankrupt.”8 This jurisprudential 
turn in reading Erie is understandable: Brandeis’s approving 
citation of several of Justice Holmes’s dissents, which do invoke 
legal positivism, suggests this conclusion. Shortly after Erie was 
decided, the Supreme Court described the case as “overruling” a 
particular way of looking at law.9 The Court apparently believed 
that Erie’s result is inconsistent with nonpositivist conceptions of 
                                                                                                         
LOGIC AND REALITY 177 (1964); RICHARD RORTY, Introduction to THE 
LINGUISTIC TURN 9 n.10 (R. Rorty ed. 1967). “The linguistic turn” has come to 
refer generically to the priority given to language in answering philosophical 
questions. See, e.g., MICHAEL DUMMETT, THE ORIGINS OF ANALYTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 4, 26-27 (1994). The linguistic turn in subject areas of philosophy 
has nothing to do with the jurisprudential turn described in this paper. 
3 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1655 
(2002); Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in 
Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1789-95 (1997); Patrick J. 
Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, 
and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 115-16 
(1993); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: 
A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1391-92 (1989); William R. 
Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 
TUL. L. REV. 907, 907-08 (1988); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the 
Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 1459, 1462 (1997). Two commentators taking 
the opposite position are Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 
UCLA L. REV. 651, 709 (1995); and George Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A 
Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 285 (1993). 
4 See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 233 (6th ed. 2004); ALLAN 
IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 444 
(2003); RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND QUESTIONS 597 (3d ed. 2001); LINDA J. SILBERMAN & 
ALLAN R. STEIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 461 (2001). 
5 FREER & PERDUE, supra note 4, at 597. 
6 SILBERMAN & STEIN, supra note 4, at 461. 
7 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
8 YEAZELL, supra note 4, at 233. 
9 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945); see also infra notes 
106-108 and accompanying text. 
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law. Many commentators take the jurisprudential turn more 
carefully. Positivism sometimes is described merely as a factor in 
Erie’s result.10 Closely connected is the biographical view that 
Brandeis’s commitment to positivism made the result more likely. 
The case also is said to rely on a narrow version of positivism.11 
Alternatively, Erie’s holding is found to depend on a view about 
allocations of law making powers between federal and state courts, 
and the latter in turn to rely on positivism.12 These different 
positions, in different ways, all find that Erie’s result relies on 
jurisprudential premises about the nature of law.   
I think the jurisprudential turn in understanding Erie is a 
mistake. Erie’s result has nothing to do with jurisprudential 
positions about the nature of law. It does not rely in any way on 
legal positivism. Erie’s result instead turns only on constitutional 
matters, such as separation of powers or the constraints of 
federalism set by the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Constitution, 
supplemented by state constitutional provisions, alone requires 
federal courts generally to follow state court determinations of 
state law. Correct jurisprudential positions about the nature of law 
have nothing to do with this requirement. Although Brandeis’s 
opinion recites a classical version of positivism, positivism is 
irrelevant to the court’s conclusion in the case.  
There are two ways to demonstrate legal positivism’s 
irrelevance to Erie. One is by a general argument that shows that 
Erie’s result is independent of positivism. The argument is 
conceptual and relies on the limited claim made by positivism. It 
demonstrates that doctrines about the nature of law are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to justify allocations of a lawmaking 
power between federal and state courts. They are insufficient, 
because claims about the nature of law by themselves cannot 
justify Erie’s requirement that federal courts defer to state court 
determinations of state law. Positivism also is unnecessary, 
because such deference can be justified by constitutional 
requirements alone, without any claims about the nature of law. 
Erie’s result therefore is independent of jurisprudential 
                                                
10 See TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 121-22 (1981) (change in jurisprudential thought was 
an implicit factor in debate over the Swift doctrine). 
11
 See EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 
181-82 (2000). 
12 See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism 
and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1478-79, 1481-82 
(1997). 
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commitments about the nature of law.13 The second argument is 
historical. It shows that positivism is irrelevant to Erie’s result by 
describing legal theorists working in the interwar years who were 
committed to positivism (appropriately specified) but found Erie 
objectionable. The position of positivist legal theorists who reject 
Erie suggests that Erie does not depend on positivism. Of course, 
such biographical data do not conclusively show positivism’s 
irrelevance to Erie: legal theorists simply could have been wrong 
about the consequences of their jurisprudential commitments for 
case law. However, the data suggest the irrelevance of positivism 
to Erie’s result.  
This article presents an historical case against the 
jurisprudential turn in understanding Erie. It does so by focusing 
on Arthur Corbin’s opposition to Erie over a significant portion of 
his long academic life. Today Corbin is remembered primarily for 
his work in contract law, principally as the author of the multi-
volume treatise Corbin on Contracts14 and the engineer of the 
Restatement (First) of Contract’s recognition of promissory 
estoppel as a basis of contract enforcement.15 Corbin’s writings on 
contract law sometimes still figure in the debate over their 
inclusion among the legal realist scholarship of the 1920s and 
1930s.16 His work in federal courts is almost forgotten, perhaps 
                                                
13 See Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal 
Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998). 
14 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (8 vols. 1950). 
15 See Jay Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 678, 683 (1984); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 62-65 
(1974). For Corbin’s own views of his participation in Section 90's drafting, see 
Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher, January 27, 1961, reprinted in 
Joseph M Perillo, Twelve Letters from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher 
Annotated, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 755, 768-69 (1993) (Section 90 is in 
“exactly the form in which he [Williston] first submitted it”). 
16 Compare Robert W. Gordon, Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School 
Faculty in the New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL 99 
(Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 
1927-1960 25 (1986); WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE 
REALIST MOVEMENT 27 (1973) (Corbin a legal realist); NEIL DUXBURY, 
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 140 n.363 (1995) (referring to 
Corbin’s “realist predilections”); see also John Henry Schlegel & David M. 
Trubek, Charles E. Clark and the Reform of Legal Education, in JUDGE 
CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 81, 105 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1992); Friedrich 
Kessler, Arthur Linton Corbin, 78 YALE L. J. 517, 519 (1974) (not a legal 
realist). For Corbin’s own disavowal of the association, see Letter from Arthur 
L. Corbin to Karl Llewellyn (Dec. 1, 1960, R/13/15) in LLEWELLYN PAPERS (on 
file with the University of Chicago Law School Library) (“I never wanted to 
belong to the ‘Realist School’ (or any other ‘School,’ except perhaps the Yale 
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because Erie’s result is accepted and its applications understood 
reasonably well. However, Corbin’s consistent and long-held 
opposition to Erie is articulated at points throughout his long 
working life, particularly between 1938 and 1964, when he 
stopped writing. It is anticipated in 1929, nine years before Erie 
was decided, in his criticism of Holmes’s dissent in Black & White 
Taxi & T. Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi & T. Co.17 In articles in 
1938 and 1941, Corbin questioned Erie’s constitutional basis and 
found objectionable consequences in federal court deference to 
state court determinations of state law. Corbin on Contracts and 
Supplements to the treatise up to 1964 continued to question Erie’s 
result. Finally, in a 1953 book review, later approvingly cited in 
supplements to Corbin on Contracts, Corbin called for Erie’s 
overruling. In work outside of contract law between 1921 and 
1964, Corbin endorsed views about the nature of law that fairly can 
be described as a version of legal positivism. Taken as a whole, 
Corbin’s work represents the position of a legal positivist at mid-
century who opposed Erie’s result on constitutional and practical 
grounds. It provides historical evidence that Erie’s result does not 
depend on a jurisprudential commitment to positivism.  
This article is structured as follows. Part I documents the 
jurisprudential turn in understanding Erie by analyzing some of 
Holmes’s famous dissents invoked in the opinion. It argues that 
Holmes’s epigrams about the nature of law in these dissents are 
deceptive: they either wrongly attribute to the majority 
jurisprudential views it need not hold or take a jurisprudential 
position unnecessary to the dissent’s view. Either way, Holmes’s 
legal positivism is irrelevant to his own dissents. Parts II-V 
together make the historical case for viewing Corbin as a legal 
positivist who objected to Erie’s result constitutional and practical 
grounds. Part II identifies a precise and plausible notion of legal 
positivism, and finds Corbin’s compact, but repeated, statements 
about law to be positivist. Part III describes and distinguishes 
Corbin’s practical and constitutional objections to Erie’s result. 
Part IV shows, contrary to the predominant view of his position, 
that Corbin’s objection to Erie is not only based on what he took to 
be its practical consequences in requiring federal court deference 
to state court determinations of state law. Corbin’s objection is 
more serious, based on vaguely specified constitutional constraints 
                                                                                                         
Law School).”). Leiter presents a concise description of legal realism. See Brian 
Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 267 (1997). 
17 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1927). 
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controlling the exercise of judicial power by federal courts. Part V 
speculates about the precise constitutional basis of Corbin’s 
opposition to Erie. A conclusion (Part VI) describes the relevance 
of Corbin’s example for the historical case against the 
jurisprudential turn in understanding Erie.  
As a preliminary note, I need to clarify what I mean by Erie 
and its “holding” or “result.” As I use them, the terms are 
interchangeable and refer to two propositions announced by the 
case: (1) that absent controlling federal constitutional or statutory 
law, federal courts must apply state law; and (2) that federal courts 
must defer to interpretations of state law articulated by that state’s 
highest court. The second proposition reaffirms a precedent at least 
as old as Green v. Lessee of Neal,18 decided in 1832. Erie can stand 
for other propositions, such as that federal courts cannot declare 
state law, or, of less continuing relevance, that Congress cannot 
authorize federal courts to make general substantive law displacing 
state law. Closely associated with Erie is the rule, established by 
cases decided after Erie, requiring “Erie predictions” when state 
law is otherwise unresolved. In such cases federal courts must 
predict the likely interpretation of state law by the state’s highest 
court and defer to that prediction. None of these other propositions 
are automatic consequences of the two propositions identified 
above. By Erie’s “holding” or “result” I refer only to the two 
propositions identified.     
 
I.      HOLMES’S DECEPTIVE DICTA 
 
The view that the distribution of lawmaking power between 
federal and state courts depends on jurisprudential positions 
predates Erie. It is Holmes’s view, stated in his dissents in Kuhn v. 
Fairmont Coal Co.19 and Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & 
Yellow Taxicab Co., and invoked in Brandeis’s opinion. There 
Holmes adopts the classical positivist position that law’s authority 
derives only from the declarations of a sovereign. He also 
characterizes views rejecting this position as conceiving of law as a 
“transcendental body of law outside of any particular State…”20 In 
other places, Holmes famously describes these views epigramically 
as conceiving of law as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”21 
                                                
18 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832); see infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. 
19 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1909). 
20 Black & White Taxi Co., 276 U.S. at 533. 
21 See id. at 533; Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Feb. 17, 1928) in 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS 215 (Mark DeWolf Howe ed., 1961); see also Kuhn, 215 
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Because Holmes’s jurisprudential observations appear as part of 
his dissents, presumably he takes them to be relevant to the 
majority opinions from which he is dissenting. He therefore must 
have thought that the result reached by the majority in the 
respective cases (a) takes a jurisprudential position about the 
nature of law, (b) rejects legal positivism, and (c) conceives of law 
as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.” Holmes is wrong here, 
however. A close look at the majority opinions in Kuhn and Black 
& White Taxicab Co. shows that either the majority could have 
shared Holmes’s positivist commitments or need not take any 
jurisprudential position at all on the nature of law. Holmes’s 
dissents invoked in Erie therefore do not depend on jurisprudential 
views stated in them. These views are instead deceptive dicta. 
Rather, Holmes’s disagreement with the majority in fact is about 
the constitutional or federal allocations of lawmaking power 
between the federal and state governments.   
To see this, consider first one of Holmes’s famous dissents 
not cited in Erie: Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.22 The Court had 
to decide there whether the federal common law of admiralty 
preempts a state statute. The majority, relying on Article III’s grant 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to federal courts and the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, found that state law cannot prejudice the 
uniformity of maritime law.23 It also found that this federal 
admiralty law was binding on state courts.24 Holmes disagrees. His 
dissent makes the same sort of argument made in his Kuhn and 
Black & White dissents. That is, it makes two assertions: one about 
positivism and the other about state’s power to make common law. 
The assertion about positivism appears in his famous epigram: 
“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but 
the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can 
be identified . . . .”25 The claim about state law appears in 
                                                                                                         
U.S. at 372 (1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The law of a State does not 
become something outside of the state court, and independent of it, by being 
called the common law.”); cf. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1916) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The only authority available is the common law or 
statutes of a state.”) 
22 244 U.S. 205 (1916). 
23 See id. at 216. 
24 See id. at 215. 
25 Id. at 222. For an earlier use of the same metaphor to express the position, see 
William M. Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State Law, 
45 AM. L. REV. 47, 56 (1911) ("There did not exist in [Marshall's] day a general 
commercial law, apart from a sovereignty to create it, floating in the air, 
intangible."). Maine invokes the same metaphor to similarly criticize a notion of 
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Holmes’s statement that “[i]f admiralty adopts common-law rules 
without an act of Congress it cannot extend the maritime law as 
understood by the Constitution. It must take the rights of the 
parties from a different authority . . . . The only authority available 
is the common law or statutes of a State.”26     
Holmes’s assertion of positivism is superfluous to the 
dissent; his disagreement with the majority turns only on the 
assertion about state law. This is because the majority’s position is 
consistent with positivist commitments. After all, the majority 
finds the uniformity of maritime law that preempts inconsistent 
state law in federal constitutional (Article III, Section 2) and 
statutory provisions (Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789). Thus, 
the majority could agree with Holmes that admiralty law is not a 
“brooding omnipresence in the sky.”27 Its contours instead are 
derived from enactments, or implications from enactments, of a 
federal sovereign. In fact, the majority finds just this, as it makes 
clear when it finds the contours of federal common admiralty law 
based on “these constitutional provisions and the federal act . . . 
.”28 In other words, Jensen’s majority concludes that a federal 
                                                                                                         
the common law. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION 
WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 38 
(10th ed. 1884) [hereinafter MAINE, ANCIENT LAW] (“Probably it will found that 
originally it was the received doctrine that somewhere, in nubibus or in gremio 
magistratuum, there existed a complete, coherent, symmetrical body of English 
law, of an amplitude sufficient to furnish principles which would apply to any 
conceivable combination of circumstances.”). Both Holmes and Meigs had 
edited the American Law Review (Holmes between 1870 and 1873), in which 
Meigs’s article later appeared. Holmes therefore might have been familiar with 
the article before his dissent in Jensen. He was familiar with Maine’s Ancient 
Law as early as 1888 and probably before publishing THE COMMON LAW in 
1881. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock, March 4, 
1888, in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 15, at 31; Letter from Oliver 
Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski, June 1, 1922, in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 
1916-1935 429-30 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1953). 
26 Jensen, 244 U.S. at 221. 
27 Robertson characterizes the consequence of Jensen as follows: “Until Jensen . 
. . the maritime law of the United States was a code of jurisdiction, procedure, 
and remedies. After [Jensen], it was a brooding omnipresence over the sea.” 
DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 193 (1970). An 
alternative understanding is possible. The majority opinion in Jensen instead 
could be understood to maintain that Article III’s admiralty clause, together with 
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, authorize federal courts to create federal 
admiralty law, preempting inconsistent state common law. Because the authority 
to create admiralty law derives from a constitutional or statutory source, it is not 
a “brooding omnipresence over the sea.” 
28 Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216. 
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sovereign authorizes the declaration of maritime law by a state 
sovereign, except when the state sovereign’s declarations 
undermine the uniformity of maritime law. Holmes’s disagreement 
with the majority therefore does not rest on endorsing or denying 
positivism.29 Instead, it relies on the state’s authority to articulate 
common law that can affect admiralty law.  
In admiralty cases, Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
reserves to litigants “common law remedies.” Holmes believes that 
the provision allows a state court to announce state common law 
remedies in exercising admiralty jurisdiction. As he put the point 
in correspondence summarizing his dissent, states have the power 
to articulate applicable state law remedies.30 Jensen’s majority 
denies that their power to do so is unrestricted when state law 
affects admiralty law. Thus, Holmes’s disagreement is over the 
preemptive effect of admiralty law. Jensen’s majority finds that the 
federal common law of admiralty constrains state law. Holmes 
finds that state common law applies, not a federal common law of 
admiralty. The dispute therefore is over the distribution of common 
lawmaking powers between federal and state courts, not over legal 
positivism.                                       
Holmes’s dissent in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.31 fits the 
same pattern. It too combines an endorsement of positivism with a 
statement about the distribution of common lawmaking powers 
between federal and state courts. Here again Holmes’s 
                                                
29 Cf. Jonathan M. Gutoff, Federal Common Law and Congressional 
Delegation: A Reconceptualization of Admiralty, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 398 
(2000) (both federal and state sovereigns could articulate law affecting maritime 
law, and that therefore the dispute between Jensen’s majority and Holmes is not 
one over the truth of legal positivism). I agree with Gutoff’s conclusion that 
Jensen’s result does not turn on positivism but understand the dispute between 
Jensen’s majority and Holmes differently. The majority, as I read it, finds a 
constitutional and statutory authorization allowing states to create law that can 
affect maritime law, as long as the state law created does not undermine its 
uniformity. Holmes regards Section 9 of the 1789 Judiciary Act as authorizing 
states to articulate common law remedies without this restriction. Thus, the 
dispute is over the scope of congressional authorization to state to create 
common law remedies in cases subject to admiralty jurisdiction. Put another 
way, the disagreement is over the authorization given the state sovereign by the 
federal sovereign. Gutoff understands the disagreement as one over the capacity 
of a state sovereign to create law independently of a federal sovereign, not over 
the authorization to do so.   
30 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock, June 1, 1917, in 
1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 21, at 246 (“Four of us dissented [in 
Jensen] in favor of the state’s power, and I can’t understand the decision . . . .”). 
31 215 U.S. 349 (1910). 
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disagreement with the majority turns only on the latter. In Kuhn the 
question certified to the Court was whether a federal court must 
apply state law concerning real estate title declared after title is 
conveyed. Relying on Burgess v. Seligman,32 the majority 
concluded that federal courts are not bound to do so in the 
circumstances: they can exercise their independent judgment about 
state law at the time title was conveyed. Holmes disagrees. His 
disagreement, however, depends only on his finding of the 
respective limits of federal and state lawmaking powers. The law 
concerning real estate title is “local” and therefore is governed by 
state law, according to Holmes. He concludes that federal courts 
are bound to follow state law governing these matters. As he stated 
the argument: “Whence does that law issue?  Certainly not from 
us. But it does issue . . . from the state courts as well from the state 
legislatures. When we know what the source of the law has said 
that it shall be, our authority is at an end.”33 Federal courts 
therefore do not have the authority to make independent 
determinations of state law.  
This conclusion is based only on a finding about the 
allocation of lawmaking powers between federal and state courts. 
Holmes believes that allowing federal courts to make an 
independent determination of state law interferes with the state’s 
authority to declare common law. This belief, together with the 
view that states have the authority to make common law, is enough 
to bar federal courts from independently determining state 
common law. Jurisprudential positions on the nature of law are 
unnecessary to reach Holmes’s conclusion. The disagreement with 
Kuhn’s majority is only over a federal court’s authority to declare 
state law, not over the status of law. The majority agrees that the 
federal court is bound to apply state law in the circumstances; it 
does not deny that the source of law is state law. It simply allows 
the court to an independent judgment about that law when a state 
court has not declared a rule governing the passage of real estate 
title. Holmes finds that allowing such an independent 
determination improperly allocates state lawmaking power to 
federal courts when it properly belongs with state courts. The 
disagreement therefore is a substantive one about the allocation of 
lawmaking power, not a conceptual dispute about the nature of 
law.  
 
                                                
32 107 U.S. 20 (1882). 
33 Kuhn, 215 U.S. at 372 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss1/4
2010] Before the Jurisprudential Turn 
 
85 
Immediately after the passage just quoted, Holmes made a 
conceptual claim about law: “The law of a State does not become 
something outside of the state court and independent of it by being 
called the common law. Whatever it is called it is the law as 
declared by the state judges and nothing else.”34 The passage 
endorses positivism. If the law of a jurisdiction is only what is 
declared by its officials, then law cannot exist “independent” of 
such declarations: law cannot be an “omnipresence in the sky.” 
Kuhn’s majority could agree. This is because its position is that, 
whatever the nature of state law, federal courts in some 
circumstances have the authority to independently determine the 
content of state law.35 Thus, the majority’s conclusion does not 
depend on denying (or asserting) the truth of positivism. As in 
Jensen, Holmes’s jurisprudential dicta therefore are irrelevant to 
his dissent in Kuhn.  
Holmes’s dissent in Black & White Taxicab Co.36 again 
both endorses positivism and makes an assertion about the 
allocation of federal and state lawmaking powers of courts. Unlike 
the other dissents, it contains a specific basis for the requirement 
that federal courts respect state common law as declared by state 
courts. As in Kuhn, in Black & White Taxicab Co. Holmes 
associates his positivism with his assertion about the allocation of 
lawmaking powers. The association makes it appear as if both 
were necessary to the dissent: 
 
If there were . . . a transcendental body of law 
outside of any particular State but obligatory within 
it . . ., the Courts of the United States might be right 
in using their independent judgment as to what it 
was. But there is no such body of law . . . . [L]aw in 
the sense in which courts speak of it today does not 
exist without some definite authority behind it . . . . 
If a state constitution should declare that on all 
matters of general law the decisions of the highest 
Court should establish the law until modified by 
statute or by a later decision of the same Court, I do 
not perceive how it would be possible for a Court of 
the United States to refuse to follow what the State 
Court decided in that domain.37        
                                                
34 Id. 
35 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
36 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. at 532-34. 
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Holmes added a rule of interpretation of sorts for finding that a 
state constitution allows its highest court to establish state law: 
“[b]ut when the constitution of a State establishes a Supreme Court 
it by implication does make that declaration as clearly as if it had 
said it in express words . . . .”38 His conclusion was that “[t]he 
authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice 
adopted by the State as its own should utter the last word.”39 Thus, 
Holmes’s argument is that the federal constitution requires federal 
courts to follow state law as declared by state actors authorized by 
the state, and that by establishing the highest state court the state 
constitution implicitly authorize their highest courts to declare state 
law. Brandeis’s opinion in Erie follows Holmes’s reasoning in 
Black & White Taxicab Co. (concurred in by Brandeis). It 
reproduces approvingly the part of first passage dealing with the 
nature of law and the passage on the state’s authority just quoted.40 
Brandeis’s opinion concludes, as does Holmes’s dissent, that the 
failure of federal courts to respect state common lawmaking 
impermissibly interferes with state authority.           
     Holmes’s dissent in Black & White Taxicab Co. again 
shows a gap between its rhetoric and reasoning. It suggests that 
considerations about the source of law require deference to state 
law. In fact, Holmes’s argument proceeds on an exclusively 
constitutional basis. Nothing in it depends on commitments, 
positivist or otherwise, about the nature of law. The demand that 
federal courts respect state law as declared by authorized state 
officials is, if true, a constitutional requirement. The allocation of 
lawmaking authority by a state constitution to its highest court 
obviously is a matter of state constitutional law. Of course, 
Holmes’s rule of interpretation for finding an implicit authorization 
to the state’s highest court is not constitutional in nature. It is a rule 
of interpretation that sets a default principle for inferring 
lawmaking authority. However, it is not a rule essential to law or 
lawmaking. The details of Holmes’s argument are controversial, 
particularly his rule of interpretation for finding the implicit 
authorization of state courts to make law. His rule is justified if 
most state constitutions were enacted with an understanding to that 
effect. Historically, this assumption is probably false. The drafters 
of most state constitutions likely thought that state courts do not 
                                                
38 Id. at 534. 
39 Id. at 535. 
40 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79. 
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make law; only legislatures do. After all, it is anachronistic to 
suppose that these drafters were working legal realists. More 
important here, Holmes’s rule of interpretation could be sound 
whatever view is adopted about the nature of law.  For example, 
suppose a norm can be law without being derived from any social 
facts, such as by being enacted by authorized officials. A state’s 
constitution still could allocate to its highest court the authority to 
determine the content of these norms. And Holmes’s interpretive 
rule still could apply, treating the state constitution’s establishment 
of a state supreme court as an implicit authorization of the supreme 
court’s authority to declare law.      
Read closely, Holmes’s dissents upon which Brandeis’s 
opinion relies in Erie do not support the view that the common 
lawmaking powers of federal and state courts depends on 
jurisprudential positions about the nature of law. Holmes’s dicta to 
the contrary are deceptive. Whether Holmes himself believed that 
his jurisprudential remarks were integral to his dissents is another 
matter. Holmes was fond of inserting epigrams first produced in 
correspondence or scholarly publications into his opinions, and 
vice versa.41 He might not have thought that the inserted epigrams 
were always essential to the opinions. This might have been the 
case with his endorsement of positivism. Further, as a dialectical 
strategy, the insertions about positivism could be effective even if 
not strictly relevant to the ongoing dissent. After all, it is one thing 
to assert that constitutionally mandated allocations of federal and 
state common lawmaking powers bind federal courts to follow 
state court determinations of state law. An opponent can disagree, 
producing a constitutional argument in response. Potentially more 
effective is the charge that allowing federal courts not to be bound 
by state court determinations of state law presupposes that law is a 
“brooding omnipresence in the sky.”42 The opponent 
understandably wants to avoid taking a position said to presuppose 
a silly view. By making the charge, the proponent avoids the need 
to produce constitutional considerations in favor of her own 
                                                
41 See, e.g., supra note 18 and accompanying text; Letter from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes to Harold Laski, February 1, 1919, in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1916-
1935, supra note 22, at 183 (“judges made law (interstitially, as I explained in 
the [Jensen] case) . . . .”); Letter from Holmes to Laski, January 29, 1926, id. at 
822-23 (“[I]t is that [error] that I have aimed at when I have said that the 
Common Law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky and that the U.S. is not 
subject to some mystic overlaw that it is bound to obey.”). 
42 Cf. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222.  See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 
(1916) (Holmes, dissenting). 
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asssertion.43    
 
II.     LEGAL POSITIVISM AND CORBIN 
 
Corbin did not hinge his opposition to Erie on views about 
the nature of law. Although he took jurisprudential positions on the 
matter, these positions do not figure in his rejection of Erie’s 
result. Corbin’s jurisprudential views, fairly described, endorse 
positivism. However, his rejection of Erie does not rely on his 
commitment to positivism. Instead, it depends on what he takes to 
be the objectionable practical and constitutional implications of the 
case. Corbin’s positivism reflects views developed before he 
considered the power of federal courts to articulate federal 
common law, principally in work published between 1914 and 
1922. In these publications Corbin describes and endorses Wesley 
Hohfeld’s analysis of the logic of legal rights, and applied it to 
legal doctrines not discussed by Hohfeld. Hohfeld’s analysis only 
describes the logical relations between basic legal notions, and 
there is no connection between an analysis of the logic of legal 
notions and views about the nature of law. The latter is part of an 
interpretation or application of these legal notions; the former is 
neutral between such interpretations. Nonetheless, in these 
publications Corbin interprets Hohfeld’s analysis of a legal right in 
a positivistic manner and makes general claims about the nature of 
law. This Part briefly rehearses the core claims of positivism and 
shows Corbin’s commitment to them, principally in articles 
published between 1914 and 1922. Parts IV and V identify 
Corbin’s nonjurisprudential criticisms of Erie’s result: Part IV 
describes his practical objections, and Part V the constitutional 




                                                
43 Holmes uses a similar dialectical strategy in his dissent in Lochner v. New 
York 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In charging the majority with imposing its own 
economic views on the interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Holmes warns that “[t]he 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. 
Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.” Id. at 75 (Holmes, dissenting). By attributing 
to the majority a controversial nonconstitutional view, he avoids having to 
address the constitutional considerations supporting the majority’s interpretation 
of the due process clause. Holmes in fact joined a number of opinions that 
invoked substantive due process to invalidate economic regulations. See Michael 
J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process 
Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1083 (1997). 
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A. Legal Positivism: Core Claims 
Legal positivism is a theory about the nature of law. It 
identifies what is distinctive about legal norms and gives them 
their status as law. Central to positivism is the claim that law is 
explained by social facts of a particular sort, although positivists 
disagree about which facts these are as well as how they explain 
law.44 For classical positivism, the particular social facts are the 
commands of a sovereign.45 Contemporary positivists focus on 
different social facts. For Hart, the social fact identified is a social 
practice among officials: a convention by which they validate 
norms using specified criteria.46 Positivists also disagree as to 
whether the social facts explaining law restrict the content of legal 
norms in any way. “Soft” (or “inclusive”) positivists hold that facts 
in a given society specify the criteria for a norm being a law.47 
That criteria in turn may be of any sort and allow for legal norms 
to have any content (consistent with the criteria). “Hard” (or 
“exclusive”) positivists limit the content of legal norms by 
restricting the criteria of validity to particular sorts of facts, such as 
the enactment of a norm or the identity of the official enacting it.48 
Behind the divide between “soft” and “hard” positivism is the 
shared commitment to accounting for law in terms of social facts.        
The other claim frequently taken to be central to positivism 
is the position that legal norms are separable from moral norms.49 
                                                
44 See, e.g., Kenneth E. Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism, in JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125, 126 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); 
JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 77 (2001); Alf Ross, Validity 
and Conflict Between Positivism and Natural Law, 4 REVISTA JURIDICA DE 
BUENOS AIRES 46, 48 (1961). 
45
 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 31 (Wilfrid 
E. Rumble ed., 1995); Jeremy Bentham, What a Law Is, in BENTHAM’S 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 149 (Bihku Parekh ed., 1973); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 330 (1988); THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 312 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968); see also Gerald J. Postema, Law 
as Command: The Model of Command in Modern Jurisprudence, 11 PHIL. 
ISSUES 470, 470 (2001); 2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE 
MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 45 (1976). 
46 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 115-16, 255 (2d ed. 1994) 
[hereinafter HART, CONCEPT OF LAW]. 
47 See Stephen R. Perry, Method and Principle in Legal Theory, 111 YALE L.J. 
1757, 1787-94 (2002); WIL J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM 
(1994); HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 42, at 250-51; Tony Honore, 
Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart 1907-1992, 84 BRIT. ACAD. 295, 315 (1994). 
48 Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, 4 LEGAL THEORY 469 (1998); Joseph 
Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN 210-38 (1994). 
49 See MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 114 (1999); 
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Legal and moral norms may coincide, depending on the criteria of 
legality adopted in a particular society. Their coincidence is an 
empirical matter, perhaps even an invariable coincidence. The 
positivist’s position is merely that the two sorts of norms need not 
coincide: it is possible that they can diverge.50 Thus, the frequently 
observed connection between some legal and moral norms does 
not show that the connection is necessary in any recognizable 
sense. The association of positivism’s claim about separability 
with its account of law is close. If law is explained by particular 
sorts of social facts, then a legal norm’s existence depends on these 
facts obtaining. The validity of at least some moral norms, 
however, depends on their content alone. Because legal and moral 
norms can have different bases, they therefore can diverge.            
Strictly, positivism’s claim about separability is not central 
to its position. This is because the contention does not distinguish 
positivism from its rival theories about the nature of law.51 
Although Hart and, most famously, Austin take the claim of 
separability to be at the core of positivism,52 nonpositivists need 
not deny its truth. For example, a natural law theorist might 
contend that an adequate theory of law must describe a rational 
standard for conduct.53 Legal norms that are immoral fail to satisfy 
these standards of practical rationality. The theorist therefore could 
agree that legal and moral norms can and often do diverge. At the 
same time, according to the natural law theorist’s implicit theory of 
law, the failure to satisfy moral norms makes these legal norms 
defective as legal norms. The standard of rationality provides a 
measure for evaluating the way in which legal norms are defective. 
This position does not deny that law depends only on social facts 
or that legal and moral norms can diverge. It only insists that a 
adequate theory of law include a normative component for 
evaluating the morality of legal norms. The divide between 
                                                                                                         
HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 46 at 185-86; Jules L. Coleman, Negative 
and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982). 
50 See KRAMER, supra note 49, at 114; Frederick Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, 
in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 31, 36 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). 
51 See Coleman, supra note 49, at 153; Kent Greenawalt, Too Thin and Too 
Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW, 
supra note 41, at 1-29 (most natural law theories are consistent with weak forms 
of positivism). 
52 See supra note 49. 
53 See Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law Jurisprudence, 9 LEGAL THEORY 241, 244 
(2003); John Finnis, Law and What I Truly Should Decide, 48 AMER. J. JURIS. 
107, 112-13 (2003); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 9-11, 
26-27, 363-64 (1980). 
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positivists and their opponents therefore turns on what makes a 
theory of law adequate, not on the denial or endorsement of the 
separability claim. Nonetheless, the claim, although not distinctive 
of positivism, historically has been associated with it.54                
  
B. Drift in Designation 
Use of the designation “legal positivism” has not always 
been confined to the claims just described. Its use has been less 
disciplined. Other claims also have been labeled as “positivist,” 
presumably because a legal theorist identified as a positivist also 
makes them. Thus, between the early nineteenth and mid-twentieth 
century, positivism variously has been identified with the 
following contentions: (1) that law consists of commands of 
authorized officials; (2) that law and morality are separable; (3) 
that analysis of the meanings of legal terms is important; and (4) 
that legal decisions can be deduced from a coherent set of legal 
norms.55 The first contention commits positivists to a particular set 
of social facts (commands) constituting law. Contentions (3) and 
(4) have nothing to do with a theory of law. Advocating the 
importance of terminological analysis of legal language is a 
methodological position compatible any theory of law. Contention 
(4) is an assertion, questionable on its own terms, about the nature 
of legal reasoning, not about the status of legal norms.  
The drift in positivism’s designation over time is 
understandable. For one thing, the term “legal positivism” seems 
not have appeared in Anglo-American jurisprudence until 1940.56 
Previously, the position was described by the broad term 
“analytical jurisprudence,” a label probably coined by Henry 
Sumner Maine.57 The lack of a precise term for the position might 
have contributed to the different sorts of contentions associated 
with it over time. A consequence of the terminological drift is 
misunderstanding: criticisms sometimes understood as criticisms 
of positivism in fact are objections to disposable contentions 
unrelated to the position. One example is the then-contemporary 
                                                
54 See supra notes 49, 55 and accompanying text. 
55 The list contains contentions appearing in part of Hart’s short survey of the 
then-contemporary use of the term. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 42, 
at 302 (Note to pg. 185); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 601 n.26 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism].   
56 See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM AND AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
32 (1998). 
57 See Wilfrid Rumble, John Austin and His Nineteenth Century Critics: The 
Case of Sir Henry Sumner Maine, 39 N. IRE. LEGAL QUART. 119, 119 (1988). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 Jurisprudence Review [March 
 
92 
criticism of the place Bentham reserved in jurisprudence for the 
moral evaluation of legal norms.58 The taxonomic objection was 
that normative evaluations were not the job of jurisprudence; they 
were the concern of substantive morality. To modern readers, the 
criticism seems ridiculous because the division of intellectual labor 
between jurisprudence and moral theory is so unimportant. But 
even if policing the proper scope of jurisprudence were important, 
the taxonomic objection does not affect positivism. This is because 
positivism, even if identified with one of the contentions above, 
does not evaluate legal norms.  
A more important consequence follows from the restricted 
way in which positivism’s theory of law was understood. Between 
the early nineteenth century and mid-twentieth century, that theory 
was the command theory of law. According to it, law consists in 
the commands of a sovereign to do or forebear from specified 
acts.59 For positivists and their opponents, Austin’s command 
theory was taken to be the most prominent expression of the 
general view.60 Positivism for them meant the command theory of 
                                                
58 See Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and Nineteenth-Century English 
Jurisprudence, 12 J. LEGAL HIST. 58, 65 (1991). Maine and Pollock later made 
the same criticism of Austin; see HENRY SUMNER MAINE, LECTURES ON THE 
EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 370 (7th ed. 1914) [hereinafter MAINE, 
LECTURES] (Austin’s discussion of moral laws does not belong philosophy of 
law but to the philosophy of legislation); FREDERICK POLLOCK, OXFORD 
LECTURES AND OTHER DISCOURSES 17 (1890) [hereinafter, POLLOCK, OXFORD 
LECTURES] (“Austin’s second, third and fourth lectures [in Lectures on 
Jurisprudence] appear to me to have no business where they are. They are not 
jurisprudence at all, but ethics out of place.”). For evidence of prominence of 
this criticism, see generally Richard A. Cosgrove, The Reception of Analytic 
Jurisprudence: The Victorian Debate on the Separation of Law and Morality, 
1860-1900, 74 DURHAM U. J. 47 (1981) [hereinafter Cosgrove, The Reception of 
Analytic Jurisprudence]. A more modern insistence on the same division of 
labor appears in HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 68 (2d ed. 1967) 
(The “task of the science of law is not to approve or disapprove of its subject, 
but to know and describe it.”).   
59 See Postema, supra note 45; see also supra note 45. 
60 See, e.g., Albert Kocourek, The Century of Analytic Jurisprudence Since John 
Austin, in 2 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS–1835-1935 201 (1935); MAINE, 
LECTURES supra note 58, at 371; THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS 
OF JURISPRUDENCE 42, 53-54 (11th ed. 1910); Charles Malcolm Platt, The 
Character and Scope of Analytical Jurisprudence, 24 AMER. L. REV. 603, 605 
(1899); Letter from Oliver Wendall Holmes to Harold Laski, September 15, 
1916, in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1916-1935, supra note 18, at 21 (“The scope 
of state sovereignty is a question of fact. It asserts itself as omnipotent in the 
sense that it asserts that what it sees fit to order it will make you obey . . . . Law 
also as well as sovereignty is a fact.”); Oliver Wendall Holmes, Codes, and the 
Arrangement of the Law, 5 AMER. L. REV. 4-5 (1870); see also Neil Duxbury, 
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law. This also meant that then-contemporary critics of positivism, 
such as Gray, Maine, Salmond, and Pollock, directed their 
objections against Austin’s notion of law as commands.61 They 
concluded that their objections against command theories of law 
showed that positivism was defective. Later positivists abandon the 
command theory. Most prominently, Hart concedes the force of 
objections against command theories and proposes an alternative 
theory of law. His theory avoids the objections by understanding 
law to consist not in commands but in a particular social practice 
among officials: a convention by which they validate norms by 
using specific criteria. The theory remains positivist because it still 
relies on social facts–a social practice among officials. The next 
section argues that Corbin does the same thing: while denying that 
law consists only in commands, he too insists that law consists of 
social facts of a specific sort. In this way Corbin remains 
committed to positivism. 
 
C. Corbin’s Positivism 
Corbin’s views about the nature of law appear at points in 
publications between 1914 and 1964, principally in articles that 
appeared between 1921 and 1929. These views endorse positivism. 
                                                                                                         
English Jurisprudence Between Austin and Hart, 91 VA. L. REV. 1, 22-24 
(2005); William Twining, General and Particular Jurisprudence–Three 
Chapters in a Story, in POSITIVISM TODAY 119, 124-25 (Stephen Guest ed., 
1996). Even Maine endorsed Austin’s version of positivism before changing his 
mind; see Henry Sumner Maine, The Conception of Sovereignty, and its 
Importance in International Law, in 1 PAPERS JURIDICAL SOC. 26, 26 (1855) 
(“[T]he ultimate analysis of every positive law inevitably resolves into a 
command of a particular nature, addressed by political superiors, or sovereigns, 
to political inferiors, or subjects.”) (emphases in original). 
61 See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 55-56 
(David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., 1997); MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, supra 
note 25, at 6, 7, MAINE, LECTURES, supra note 58, at 382-83; FREDERICK 
POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 27-29 (1929) [hereinafter 
POLLOCK, FIRST BOOK]; JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE AND THE THEORY 
OF THE LAW 50-52 (3d ed. 1910). For the identification of positivism with the 
command theory of law, see, for example, POLLOCK, FIRST BOOK, supra at vii 
(“[T]he philosophy of the English or ‘analytical’ school is not mine . . . .”); 
supra notes 52, 56, 57 and accompanying text. For a description of the common 
themes of the criticisms, see Cosgrove, The Reception of Analytic 
Jurisprudence, supra note 58. Sugarman gives an interesting account of the 
centrality of Austin’s writings to late nineteenth century English legal education. 
See David Sugarman, Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making of 
the Textbook Tradition, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 26, 35-36 
(William Twining ed., 1986). For a contemporary criticism of positivism that 
identifies it with command theories, see HAYEK, supra note 45, at 50-52. 
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Corbin nowhere uses the label “legal positivism” or even “analytic 
jurisprudence” to describe them. The omission is not surprising. 
The designation “legal positivism” had no currency before 1940, 
and the label “analytic jurisprudence” is not specific enough to 
designate views about the nature of law.62 Near the end of his life 
Corbin reported that he had never read Austin, and this might 
misleadingly suggest that he did not endorse positivism.63 
Nonetheless, in his early articles he makes the core claims 
comprising positivism. At the same time they show that Corbin 
rejects only Austinian positivism.64  
For Corbin, law exists in the context of a particular sort of 
social fact: the regular actions of those authorized to create rules 
governing conduct. Corbin made the point repeatedly in articles 
published in 1919 and throughout the 1920s. In Legal Analysis and 
Terminology, he stated that “law is a rule concerning human 
conduct, established by those agents of an organized society who 
have legislative power” and includes judicial powers among 
legislative powers.65 Corbin took the same position in Jural 
Relations and Their Classification: “[w]e speak of the law and of 
                                                
62 See Sebok, supra note 56, at 23 (positivism “overlapped partially” with 
analytic jurisprudence). 
63
 See TWINING, supra note 16, at 394 n.8. Twining accepts Corbin’s 
autobiographical statement as true; see id. at 29. However, the statement should 
not be credited; the detail of Corbin’s citation practice shows that he probably 
had read Austin. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, The Dead Hand of the Common 
Law, 27 YALE L. J. 668, 669 n.3, 671 n.18, 672 ns. 15 & 16 (1918) [hereinafter 
Corbin, Dead Hand]; Arthur L. Corbin, Law in the Making, 38 YALE L.J. 270, 
272 (1929) (book review); see also WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF CONTRACT 9, 27 n.1 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Amer. ed. 1919) 
(references to Austin in Anson’s text and Corbin’s editorial notes). 
64 LaPiana finds Corbin’s commitment to positivism in his use of the case 
method of instruction. See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE 
ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 146 (1994) (referring to the 
“positivistic impulses” of the case method). Cf. Stephen M. Feldman, From 
Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 
VANDER. L. REV. 1387, 1426 (1997) (positivist approach of Langellians to legal 
study “closely correlated” with case method of teaching). I am unable to see that 
a theory of law has any pedagogic consequences for the way in which law is 
taught, and LaPiana does not suggest any. A theory of law and the case method 
seem to me to be separate matters. Cf. A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of 
the Legal Treatise, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 677 (1981) (Langdell’s method of 
legal research and his case method of teaching separate “achievements;” case 
method had no effect on production of treatises.). The argument in the text 
below finds Corbin’s commitment to positivism in his views about law, not 
about legal education. 
65 Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L. J. 163, 164 
(1921) [hereinafter Corbin, Legal Analysis]. 
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legal relations . . . merely because the physical consequences 
involve some conduct on the part of the agents of society and 
because there are rules expressing a degree of uniformity in their 
action, enabling us to predict with some confidence what that 
action will be.”66 In Conditional Rights and the Functions of An 
Arbitrator Corbin connects the predictability of authoritative 
behavior with its uniformity when he stated that “we cannot predict 
[a result] as a probability unless there is a rule of societal action, 
unless there has been a uniformity of executive and judicial action 
in the past or a legislative declaration applicable to the future. Such 
a uniformity or such a legislative declaration constitutes a rule of 
law.”67 The same article concludes that “a highly acceptable and 
useful definition of ‘law’ would be: a rule of uniformity of societal 
action by which we can predict with some degree of certainty what 
will be the conduct of societal agents under specified sets of 
circumstances.”68 He made very similar statements in a book 
review and other articles published in the 1920s.69  
Two features of Corbin’s position are worth noticing. First, 
the position identifies legal norms by their source or pedigree. That 
is, a norm is a legal norm because it is created by the regular acts 
of those legislative or judicial officials authorized to do so. Its 
content is fixed by the regular behavior of these officials in 
creating norms. The norms created by officials therefore can have 
any sort of content (consistent with their authorization). Thus, 
Corbin endorses positivism’s core claim to the effect that law 
consists in social facts. For Corbin, the particular social facts 
selected are norms created by regularities in the behavior of 
authorized officials. Richard Posner recently has taken a similar 
position, urging that law consists in the activities of authorized 
officials.70 Second, Corbin’s identifies law with regularities in 
                                                
66 Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 
230 (1921) [hereinafter Corbin, Jural Relations]. 
67Arthur L. Corbin, Conditional Rights and the Functions of an Arbitrator, 44 L. 
QUART. REV. 24, 25 (1928) [hereinafter Corbin, Conditional Rights]; see also id. 
(“To say that you have a Right that I shall not cut your tree is to predict that you 
can get societal aid to prevent or punish me.”). 
68 Id. at 28. 
69 See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 14 
AMER. BAR ASS. J. 602, 603 (1928); Arthur L. Corbin, What is a Legal 
Relation?, 5 IL. L. QUART. 50, 50 (1922); Corbin, Law in the Making, supra note 
59; for a later statement, see Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 
50 YALE L. J. 762, 765 (1941) [hereinafter Corbin, Several States]. 
70 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 225 (1990); see 
also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81, 257 
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officials’ behavior, not in single instances of such conduct. 
According to him, law consists in “uniformity of action” among 
officials. Here Corbin tends to run together the evidence for well-
founded predictions of official behavior (uniformity in behavior) 
with the target of the prediction itself (instances of official 
behavior), as the above passages illustrate.71 The apparent thought 
is that, other things being equal, the more uniform the behavior, the 
better confirmed the prediction of instances of that behavior. The 
requirement of uniformity in behavior thereby allows Corbin to 
distinguish idiosyncratic official behavior from predominant 
official behavior. In this way the degree of frequency in judicial 
behavior allows him to distinguish the “minority rule” from the 
“the rule” controlling in a jurisdiction. 
Corbin’s position rejects command theories of law. If law 
consists in norms created by the uniform acts of authorized 
officials, these acts can be of any sort. The acts need not only take 
the form of commands; they also can be permissions or exercises 
or delegations of powers. Thus, to be consistent, Corbin must 
reject Austin’s conception of law as consisting only of commands. 
He does so in several papers in the 1920s that describe and 
advocate Hohfeld’s classification of legal rights. Hohfeld found the 
notion of a legal right ambiguous and the terminology designating 
it inadequate to accurately express common legal notions. To 
clarify the notion of a legal right, he did not characterize its 
components or otherwise analyse it. Instead Hohfeld describes the 
relations between legal notions, all commonly referred to as 
legalrights.72 His description identifies eight legal “positions”and 
four pairs of logical relations between them, as in this table: 
                                                                                                         
(2003). 
71 See also Corbin, Conditional Rights, supra note 67, at 28 (“To say that you 
have a Right . . . is to predict that you can get societal aid to prevent or punish 
me.”). For the same conflation of evidence and the target of evidence, see 
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 10 (1949); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE 
BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1960). For Llewellyn’s later qualifications, see 
Acknowledgments, id. at ix. 
72 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied to Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913), 26 YALE L. J. 710 
(1917). For a general description, see Matthew H. Kramer, Rights Without 
Trimmings, in A DEBATE ABOUT RIGHTS 7 (Matthew H. Kramer et al. eds., 
1998). Two other presentations are L.W. SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF 
RIGHTS 18-31 (1987); and Alan D. Cullison, Logical Analysis of Legal 
Doctrine: The Normative Structure of Positive Law, 53 IOWA L. REV. 1209 
(1968). A useful critical application of Hohfeld’s analysis appears in John 
Finnis, Some Professional Fallacies About Rights, 4 ADELAIDE L. REV. 377 
(1972). 
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Right      Privilege   Power       Immunity 
             Duty       No-right   Liability    Disability  
 
Corbin follows Hohfeld in taking each legal notion 
(“fundamental legal conception”) to describe a relation between 
two persons (A and B).73 The relation defines the person’s legal 
position with respect to the other person.  Because a legal relation 
holds between two persons, it can be defined from either person’s 
legal position. Thus, by focusing on either persons’ position with 
respect to the other, the same legal relation can be described in 
different but logically equivalent ways. Hohfeld called these 
positions “correlatives”: mutual entailments between legal 
positions. Correlatives are synonyms and each correlate is a 
synonym for its correlate. Correlatives therefore are logical 
entailments with the persons holding the entailed legal positions 
reversed. Further, each legal position is incompatible with another 
particular legal position. Accordingly, each legal position negates 
another particular legal position. Hohfeld calls these positions and 
their negations “opposites;” they are logically contradictory legal 
positions held by the same person. (In fact, in a handwritten 
annotation to his copy of Legal Analysis and Terminology, Corbin 
describes the opposite legal position as “contradictory.”74)  
In the above table, the legal positions in the columns, as 
identified by Hohfeld, are “correlatives” of each other and the legal 
positions in the diagonals are “opposites” of each other. For 
example, if A has a right against B that B do x, the correlative of 
A’s right against B is B’s duty to A to do x. A’s right can be 
described either from A’s position or from B’s position, its 
correlative. Also, A’s right that B do x is the negation (“opposite”) 
of A’s no-right that B do x. Likewise, if B has a duty to A to do x, 
B does not have the privilege (liberty) of doing x. B’s privilege to 
do x is the negative (“opposite”) of B’s duty to do x. By 
identifying the legal positions and logical relations of mutual 
entailment and logical contradiction between them, Hohfeld and 
Corbin hoped to improve the description of legal concepts and 
judicial reasoning.75  
                                                
73 Corbin, Jural Relations  supra note 66, at 165 (“The term ‘legal relation’ 
should always be used with reference to two persons, neither more nor less.”). 
74 Corbin, Jural Relations, supra note 66, at 166 (annotation in Corbin’s copy 
deposited in Yale Law Library). 
75 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
to Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 22, 30 (1913); Wesley Newcomb 
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Corbin’s articles in the 1920s discussing Hohfeld’s work 
mainly describe and advocate its results. But in places his 
advocacy extends beyond Hohfeld in two important respects. First, 
Hohfeld described the legal notions he identified as “fundamental 
legal conceptions” and “sui generis,” thereby suggesting that all 
were logical primitives: all necessary to express the logical 
relations holding between legal positions. In Jural Relations and 
Their Classification, Corbin disagrees with the suggestion. He 
thinks that the logical relations Hohfeld identified can be described 
using only two legal notions: duty and power.76 Although he does 
not further elaborate on the point, Corbin is correct here. In fact, 
Hohfeld’s logical relations can be described selecting as logical 
primitives any two notions, one from the right/duty/liberty/no-right 
array and the other from the power/liability/immunity/disability 
array.77 Second, Corbin goes beyond Hohfeld in specifying the 
nature of the legal positions identified by Hohfeld. Hohfeld’s work 
was limited to the identification of legal conceptions and their 
logical relations. Corbin went beyond Hohfeld in specifying the 
nature of law and legal positions. As Corbin later stated in 
unpublished correspondence, Hohfeld was interested only in the 
“logical” and “analytic,” while he was concerned with the 
“sociological” aspects of law.78 Part of Corbin’s “sociological” 
                                                                                                         
Hohfeld, A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American Universities 
Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present 
Day?, 1914 PROC. AMER. ASSOC. L. SCH. 76, 96 (1914); see also Corbin, What 
is a Legal Relation?, supra note 69, at 51; Arthur L. Corbin, Foreward, WESLEY 
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING xiv (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1964). 
76 Corbin, Legal Analysis, supra note 65, at 230. 
77 See Kevin W. Saunders, A Formal Analysis of Hohfeldian Relations, 23 
AKRON L. REV. 465, 471 (1990). Essentially the technique works by using the 
relations of logical entailment and negation of a logical entailment. For instance, 
“right” and “duty” entail each other; “no right” and “privilege” are negations of 
“right” and “duty,” respectively. Thus, because “right” and “duty” are paired by 
entailment, so too must their respective negations, “no-right” and “privilege.” 
“Right” therefore can be defined in terms of “duty,” “privilege” in terms of “no-
right,” and “no-right” as the negation of “duty.” Similarly, “power” and 
“liability” are mutually entailing, and therefore their respective negations, 
“disability” and “immunity”are paired. “Liability” therefore can be defined in 
terms of “power,” and “disability” as the negation of “power.” See ALF ROSS, 
DIRECTIVES AND NORMS 119-120 (1968).   
78 Letter from Arthur Corbin to Eugene Rostow, August 10, 1957, quoted in 
N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 106 (1997); see also Corbin, Foreword, supra note 
75, at xiv. 
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concern was to specify the nature of law and legal relations. 
Corbin’s specification rejects the command theory of law. 
Such a theory sees all legal relations as directly or indirectly 
involving commands.79 Corbin dismissed this view in Jural 
Relations and Their Classification in the course of presenting and 
endorsing Hohfeld’s account of legal relations: 
 
Must a rule of law always be a societal command 
backed by force? It is perilous to try to state the 
juristic ideas of another man, it is so easy to 
misunderstand and misstate. But one who thinks 
that there can be no rule of law and no jural relation 
between men without societal constraint seem to 
insist that law does nothing but command. There is 
no doubt that the command element is of the utmost 
importance; and according to Hohfeld’s 
classification this element is the factor that defines 
rights and duties. But it seems to some of us that 
society not only commands, but also permits and 
enables and disables . . . . And this is true whether 
there is any societal command or constraint then 
existing or not. It is difficult to see any element of 
societal constraint in the concept of permission or of 
enabling or disabling.80 
 
He is making the now-familiar observation here that legal rules 
that create the power to alter legal relations are not properly 
describable as commands.81 Corbin makesthe same point 
elsewhere as well.82 In the above passage, he clearly has in mind 
                                                
79 See AUSTIN, supra note 45, at 29. 
80 Corbin, Jural Relations, supra note 66, at 237. 
81
 Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 49-58, 98-106 (1990); 
George Henrik von Wright, On the Logic and Ontology of Norms, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 89, 97-100 (J.W. Davis et al. eds., 1969); HART, 
CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 43, at 27-28 (all distinguishing between power-
conferring and duty-imposing rules). 
82 See Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 52; Corbin, Law in the Making, 
supra note 63, at 272. This seems to reflect a change in Corbin’s position, at 
least with respect to concept of powers (“enabling”). Corbin included an 
editorial note in his 1919 edition of Anson’s textbook on contract law suggesting 
that the correlative of a power, a liability, can be defined in terms of a 
command: “The term ‘liability’ is one of at least double signification . . . . In a 
second sense, the term ‘liability’ is the correlative of power . . . . In this case 
society is not commanding performance, but it will so command if the possessor 
of the power does some operative act.” ANSON, supra note 63, at 9 n.3. Because 
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Austin’s command theory as a target. Corbin’s attribution of a 
command theory to Hohfeld’s work on legal relations (“Hohfeld’s 
classification”) is inaccurate. Because the work only identifies 
legal positions and describes logical relations between them, it 
does not specify the nature of legal positions.83 In fact, the logical 
relations Hohfeld identifies hold whatever the nature of legal 
positions turns out to be. Contrary to Corbin, in Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions Hohfeld does not consider the command 
element to define a legal right or duty, because he takes these 
notions to be “sui generis”84—and therefore undefined.85 Corbin’s 
attribution ignores the limited purpose of Hohfeld’s work. 
However, more important here is Corbin’s own assessment of 
command theories of law: he rejects these theories while still 
holding that legal relations consist in particular social facts 
(uniformities in authorized official behavior). 
Corbin’s position is not eccentric. It is the same position 
often taken by prominent nineteenth and early twentieth century 
critics of Austin. They too rejected Austin’s command theory of 
law while still insisting that law consists in social facts other than 
the commands of a sovereign. Gray and Pollock, for instance, both 
deny that law can be understood as commands.86 At the same time 
Gray also holds that only the rules established by courts in 
deciding cases are law.87 Rules announced by judicial decisions are 
particular social facts. Although less clear, Pollock views law as a 
                                                                                                         
correlatives are synonyms and a liability is the correlative of a power, the 
passage allows powers to be defined by the commands that society will issue if 
certain operative acts are performed. 
83 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. As a biographical matter Hohfeld 
probably interpreted the legal positions and their relations in an Austinian 
manner. See TWINING, supra note 16, at 395 n.8 (Corbin’s comment that 
“Hohfeld started with Austin”); G. Edward White, The American Law Institute 
and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 27 (1997) 
(Hohfeld “devotee” of Austin). However, Hohfeld’s analytic work itself does 
not require this interpretation, and Hohfeld himself does not provide the 
interpretation in the work. See Hohfeld, A Vital School, supra note 75, at 99 
(restricted scope of analytical jurisprudence). I therefore disagree with White 
that Hohfeld’s analysis “strongly suggested” legal rules in the form of 
commands backed by a sanction. See White, supra  at 28. 
84 See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, supra note 75, at 30. 
85  See id at 36. 
86 See GRAY, supra note 61; POLLOCK, FIRST BOOK, supra note 61, at 28; 
FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 50 (1882) 
[hereinafter POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE]; Law and Command, 1 L. 
MAG. & REV. (New Series) 189 (1872). 
87 See GRAY, supra note 61, at 65, 205. 
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set of rules derived from formal enactments or custom that are 
recognized as binding.88 The recognition of enactments or custom 
also is a matter of social fact. (Pollock does not restrict the 
recognition to the judicial adoption of operative rules.) Thus, 
although Grey and Pollock understood their criticisms of the 
command theory of law as criticisms of positivism, in fact they 
accept positivism’s central commitment to explaining law by social 
facts. Their objection is only to a particular version of positivism: 
Austinian positivism.89 This is Corbin’s considered position too. 
  Corbin also appears to endorse positivism’s claim that legal and 
moral norms are separable. Although it is anachronistic to read 
Corbin as concerned with the question of the relation of law and 
morality, he says enough to justify finding that he probably 
endorses the separability claim. In Legal Analysis and Terminology 
and other articles, Corbin understands a legal rule merely as 
statement about the regularity in officials’ behavior. A legal rule, 
for him, is a statement of the uniform response of officials to 
certain facts. (Corbin apparently is not concerned with the 
prescriptive nature of rules.) Correspondingly, a nonlegal rule is a 
statement of the uniform response of nonofficials to certain facts. 
Because the responses of officials and nonofficials to certain facts 
can differ, legal and nonlegal rules can differ too. Corbin draws 
this conclusion in What is a Legal Relation? when he writes that 
“[a] person needs to know both how this combination of facts will 
affect the conduct of societal agents [i.e., officials] and how it will 
affect the conduct of private individuals. As to the first, he is in the 
field of what we call legal relations; as to the second, he is in the 
field of morality, fashion or whatnot”90 Because the behavioral 
responses of officials and nonofficials can differ, legal and “moral” 
rules can differ too. The two therefore are separable because they 
can diverge. 
More generally, Corbin’s views on the development of 
legal rules supports the same conclusion. Focusing on judicially 
                                                
88 See POLLOCK, FIRST BOOK, supra note 61; cf. POLLOCK, OXFORD LECTURES, 
supra note 58, at 9 (positive law as law actually existing and operative). 
89 Twining also counts Gray and Pollock among legal positivists based on their 
commitment to the separability of law and morality. See Twining, supra note 60, 
at 128. Gray and Pollock both shared this commitment; see GRAY, supra note 
61, at 205; POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 86, at 299. Because 
nonpositivists can share the commitment too, it cannot be used to identify 
positivist positions; see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. Gray and 
Pollock are legal positivists because in different ways they hold that law is 
explainable only in terms of particular social facts. 
90 Corbin, What is a Legal Relation?, supra note 69, at 52 (emphasis added). 
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created rules, he believes that legal rules change in response to 
changes in social mores and customs.91 In his view, they are 
subject to a pattern of evolution in which variant rules compete 
with each other for adoption in a jurisdiction. Although Corbin 
does not specify the mechanism by which rules are selected, he 
repeatedly draws an analogy to adaptation by natural selection.92 
The observation that legal rules or institutions evolve was not 
novel at the time Corbin wrote.93 However, the selection among 
competing rules within a jurisdiction makes Corbin’s view 
distinctive.94 It also allows for the possibility that moral and legal 
norms having different content may be adopted. Legal and moral 
norms may be adopted in response to changes in different factors, 
at different rates. Because the selection of legal and moral norms 
need not be subject to the same selective pressures, and the truth of 
                                                
91 See Arthur L. Corbin, A Creative Process, 6 YALE L. REP. 2, 14 (1959); see 
also Arthur L. Corbin, Preface, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii (3d ed. 
1947); The Law and the Judges, 3 YALE REV. 234 (1914). Corbin’s observation 
was shared by Walter Wheeler Cook. See Walter Wheeler Cook, Hohfeld’s 
Contributions to the Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721, 738 (1919). For Corbin’s 
likely influence on Cook’s views about legal change, see JOHN HENRY 
SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 56-57 
(1995). 
92 See Corbin, The Law and the Judges, supra note 91, at 238, 249; see also 
Corbin, Conditional Rights, supra note 67, at 25; Arthur L. Corbin, The 
Common Law of the United States, 47 YALE L. J. 1351, 1352 (1938); Corbin, 
Dead Hand, supra note63, at 670-71; ARTHUR L. CORBIN, Preface, 1 CORBIN 
ON CONTRACTS v (1950) [hereinafter CORBIN, Preface] ; ANSON, supra note 60, 
at 408 n.3 (all rights dependent on prevailing mores, changing as mores change 
in the course of evolutionary development); Corbin, supra note 66, at vii; Arthur 
L. Corbin, Judicial Process, 33 CONN. BAR J. 281, 285-86 (1959); Arthur L. 
Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years at Law, 13 KANS. L. REV. 183, 186 (1964). 
93 The idea that law evolves over time obviously predates Corbin; cf. Albert 
Altschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1996) (Holmes 
and the realists did not invent the notion that law and legal institutions evolve or 
adapt to new circumstances); PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION 72-98 (1980) 
(survey of nineteenth century views of legal evolution in which legal change 
occurs according to predetermined stages); see generally J.W. BURROW, 
EVOLUTION AND SOCIETY (1966). Pollock explicitly compares Maine’s 
historical work to Darwin’s account of evolution; see POLLOCK, OXFORD 
LECTURES, supra note 58, at 41 (“The doctrine of evolution [referring to Charles 
Darwin’s “philosophy of natural history”] is nothing else than the historical 
method applied to the facts of nature; the historical method is nothing else than 
the doctrine of evolution applied to human societies and institutions.”). 
94 See E. Donald Elliot, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 38, 57-58 (1985); CORBIN, Preface, supra note 87, at v (“A 
judge selects and words a rule, puts it to work on the litigants before him, and 
submits it for use in other cases, if lawyers and judges believe that it is a good 
working rule for them.”). 
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a moral norm turns on its content not its adoption, the two sets of 
adopted norms need not coincide. Thus, Corbin’s views about the 
evolution of legal rules allows for legal and moral norms to 
diverge. This is enough to justify the view that the two sorts of 
norms are separable.        
 
 III.    CORBIN’S NONJURISPRUDENTIAL OPPOSITION TO Erie 
 
Corbin’s opposition to Erie’s result has nothing to do with 
his commitment to legal positivism. In fact, it has nothing to do 
with his jurisprudential views generally. Whatever else Erie stands 
for, the case establishes two propositions: (1) that absent 
controlling federal constitutional or statutory law, federal courts 
must apply state law, and (2) that federal courts must defer to 
interpretations of state law articulated by that state’s highest 
court.95 Opposition to Erie therefore must deny either or both of 
these propositions. In turn, for such denials to depend on an 
endorsement of positivism, positivism must provide a reason for 
rejecting one or both of Erie’s two propositions. (Correspondingly, 
for endorsement of Erie to depend on positivism, positivism must 
be a reason for endorsing both propositions.) Corbin accepts 
proposition (1) but rejects the federal court deference that 
proposition (2) requires. Against (2), he believed that federal 
courts have the authority to determine state law independently of 
interpretations of state law by that state’s highest court. He based 
his objections to Erie’s requirement of federal court deference on 
practical and constitutional considerations, not jurisprudential 
ones. 
 
A.  “Brooding Omnipresence” Over Iowa and 
Pennsylvania                                  
Corbin repeatedly makes it very clear that the basis of his 
objection to Erie is not jurisprudential. He does so by accepting 
Holmes’s perjorative characterization of antipositivism as the view 
that law is a “brooding omnipresence in the sky,” recited 
approvingly in Brandeis’s opinion in Erie, while still rejecting 
Erie’s result. Holmes’s characterization presents the opponent of 
positivism with only two alternatives: either law consists in the 
declarations of authorized officials, including federal or state 
courts, or consists in matters entirely unrelated to social facts of 
any sort. The latter alternative is telegraphed as the view that law is 
                                                
95 See supra text at p. 7.  
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a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”96 If Corbin’s opposition to 
Erie rested on jurisprudential positions, he would have had to do 
two things. First, he would have had to endorse one of the 
alternative views of law or argue for another alternative. Second, 
he would have had to argue that the alternative he endorses 
justifies the rejection of Erie. Corbin did not take the second step. 
Instead, he agreed with Holmes’s rejection of antipositivism but 
argued that opposition to Erie is justified on nonjurisprudential 
grounds.                 
Corbin signaled the nonjurisprudential basis of his 
opposition to Erie even before the case was decided. In a 1929 
article promoting the American Law Institute’s project of restating 
case law, he assessed Holmes’s then-recent dissent in Black & 
White Taxicab Co. Corbin recited the dissent’s two principal 
points: that there is no “August corpus” or “transcendental body of 
law” outside the law created by the decisions of state courts and 
that the Constitution prohibits federal courts from creating federal 
common law. His assessment of these points is significant: “[t]he 
present writer is quite in agreement with Mr. Justice Holmes if he 
means that an August corpus of universal and unchangeable rules; 
but he is no more able to find such an ‘August corpus’ within the 
confines of the state of Iowa than in all of the United States put 
together; and he believes that the federal courts are just as fully 
authorized to declare and build up common law in the cases 
properly arising before them, as are the courts of a single state.”97 
The assessment explicitly separates Holmes’s view of the nature of 
common law from his view about the constitutionality of federal 
courts creating a separate body of common law. Corbin agrees 
with Holmes that common law is created by the decisions of state 
courts, as he repeats in a later article.98 However, he denies that the 
Constitution prohibits federal courts from articulating common law 
independently of these decisions. Federal courts are “just as fully 
authorized” to declare common law as state courts. Thus, Corbin 
agrees with Holmes’s jurisprudential views about the nature of law 
                                                
96 Austin also presented opponents with the same two alternatives: either 
common law is created by the decisions of courts or it is a “miraculous 
something made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity and merely 
declared from time to time by judges.” JOHN AUSTIN, 2 LECTURES ON 
JURISPRUDENCE 655 (5th ed. 1855). 
97 Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law 
Institute, 15 IOWA L. REV. 19, 25 (1929) [hereinafter Corbin, Restatement of the 
Common Law]. 
98 See id. at 25. 
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expressed in his Black & White Taxicab Co. dissent while 
disputing the constitutional conclusion Holmes reaches there. 
Corbin’s assessment therefore signals that his constitutional 
assessment of the power of federal courts to declare common law 
are unrelated to his jurisprudential views.     
His response to Erie takes the same form. In a note on Erie 
published a few months after the decision, Corbin agrees with 
Erie’s proposition that there is no general federal common law. He 
construed this to mean that is “no system of universal general rules 
and principles, no ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky.’”99 The note 
then asks Socratically whether under Erie a federal court judge is 
barred constitutionally from looking beyond the opinions of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to determine Pennsylvania law. 
Corbin goes on to find the limitation objectionable, as inconsistent 
with a “judge’s work.”100 However, he does not attribute the 
objectionable limitation to Erie. Instead, the note puts the criticism 
conditionally: if Erie requires following the judicial opinions of the 
state supreme court, then the result is objectionable. In The Law of 
the Several States Corbin criticizes Erie’s implementation without 
adding the earlier qualification.101 However, as in the 1938 note, he 
praised Holmes’s dictum, quoted in Brandeis’s opinion, that the 
common law is not a “brooding omnipresence in the sky”: “[T]his 
is true without regard to the territorial acreage over which an 
omnipresence broods . . . . But in every case alike [common law 
rules] . . . are man-made, they are not omnipresent, and they are 
not in the sky.”102 He then asks whether Erie demands that a 
federal court abide by an inferior state court’s interpretation of 
state law when unresolved by the state’s supreme court.103 Thus, as 
in his note on Erie, Corbin’s criticism of Erie’s implementation 
continues to have nothing to do with Holmes and Brandeis’s views 
about the nature of law.         
Corbin was not alone in finding jurisprudential views 
irrelevant to Erie’s result. Other contemporary assessments of the 
case noticed this too. Walter Wheeler Cook, for instance, observed 
that Swift, overruled by Erie, did not depend on assuming the 
existence of the “August corpus” of common law designated by 
Holmes: a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.” It was enough, he 
noted, to believe that federal courts have the authority to articulate 
                                                
99 See Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 92, at 1351. 
100 See id. at 1352. 
101 See Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 764. 
102 See id. at 765. 
103 See id. 
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common law when a matter is not governed by state statute.104 
Charles Clark, Corbin’s former colleague, recited Corbin’s 
question “Is there an omnipresence brooding over the state of 
Pennsylvania?” and found that this is not the question that divides 
Swift and Erie. For Clark, the question “really at issue” is where 
common law is to operate.105 Clark concludes that this is a question 
to be decided by “policy” (without specifying the “policy” that is 
to do the work). Working jurists noticed the irrelevance of 
jurisprudential to Erie too. Justice Rutledge’s dissent in Guarantee 
Trust Co. v. York denies that the question whether a federal court 
in an action in equity must apply the state statute of limitations 
turns on views about the nature of law.106 Rather, Rutledge sees the 
issue as one of congressional authorization allowing federal courts 
to apply their own statutes of limitation in actions in equity. York 
holds that a state statute of limitations is a matter of substance that 
must be applied by a federal court adjudicating an equitable claim. 
Rutledge disagrees, finding that the Rules of Decision Act 
implicitly authorizes federal courts in such cases to fashion their 
own statute of limitations.107 He denies that his position depends 
on a “different jurisprudential climate or a kind of ‘brooding 
omnipresence in the sky.’”108 Because Rutledge considers the 
position to be consistent with Erie’s result, he must consider Erie’s 
result also to depend on statutory restrictions on lawmaking by 
federal courts, not on jurisprudential views about the nature of law. 
 
B. The Rejection of Deference: Judicial Opinions and 
Binding Law 
Corbin believed that federal court judges properly may 
make a judgment about state law independent of state court 
interpretations of that law. He rejects Erie because it requires 
federal courts to defer to state supreme court interpretations of 
state law. Corbin’s position was not unusual. The scholarly 
commentary of the 1940s and early 1950s also was critical of 
Erie’s requirement of federal court deference.109 It too generally 
                                                
104 See Walter Wheeler Cook, Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 ILL. 
L. REV. 493, 520 (1942), reprinted in WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL 
AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 142-43 (1942). 
105 See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding 
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 275 (1946). 
106 York, 326 U.S. at 113 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
107 Id. at 114. 
108 Id. 
109 See, e.g., 2 CROSSKEY, infra note 161, at 835-937, esp. 903 (1953); infra 
notes 161-63 and accompanying text; HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT 
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questioned an unconditional deference to inferior state court 
interpretations of state law. Corbin goes further and denies that 
federal courts are bound even by state supreme court 
pronouncements of state law. His views formed the basis for a 
critical consensus on the matter. Critics who questioned Erie’s 
requirement of deference to state court interpretations of state law 
often relied on Corbin to support their position.110 
As noted above, Corbin accepts Erie’s holding that, absent 
an applicable federal constitutional provision or statute, federal 
courts in diversity cases must apply state law. He only denies the 
case’s conclusion that federal courts are bound by the state 
supreme court’s articulation of state law. In his 1938 note 
describing Erie, Corbin asks rhetorically whether it is 
“unconstitutional” for a federal court to “go outside the opinion of 
the judges in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.”111 In The Law 
of the Several States, he concluded that a federal court is not bound 
by state court opinions on a state law matter.112 The opinions 
instead are merely one sort of data the federal court must use in 
interpreting state law: “The federal court, like a state court, must 
determine what the state law is by the use of ‘all the available 
data.’. . . They include the state constitution and statutes, former 
opinions of the state courts of every rank, opinions of the courts of 
other states . . . [and] the mores and practices of the 
community.”113 (Corbin on Contracts contains a statement to the 
same effect.114) Thus, federal courts, using this data, must make an 
                                                                                                         
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 628 (1953) 
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS] (“Should the federal 
court entertain an argument that a prior decision of the highest state court should 
be overruled?”); Note, Recent Cases–Federal Jurisdiction, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 
1065, 1067 (1952) (“A nicer balance between the desire for uniformity and the 
exercise of a federal judge’s broad magisterial function ought to be striven 
for.”); James W. Moore & Robert Stephan Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare 
Decisis and Law of the Case, 21 TEX. L. REV. 514, 519 (1943) (describing 
Erie’s requirement of federal court deference as “rigid”); 1 JAMES W. MOORE, 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.15, 245 (Cum. Supp. 1944) (“Blind adherence 
to a particular state decision . . . without evaluating it in the light of other 
relevant data as to what state law is, will result in injustice and a perversion of 
the state law which the federal court sets out to apply.”). 
110 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 103, at 630; 
Clark, supra note 105, at 270 n.14 (both relying on Corbin’s The Laws of the 
Several States). 
111 Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 92, at 1352. 
112 See Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 772. 
113 Id. at 771 (emphasis added). 
114 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 830 at 332 (1950). An 
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independent judgment about the content of state law. They 
therefore are not bound by state supreme court interpretations of 
state law. 
Corbin’s view of the authoritativeness of judicial 
expositions of state law rejects not only Erie but entrenched 
precedent preceding it. Early nineteenth century case law had 
established that state supreme courts were authoritative expositors 
of state law. Federal courts were bound to follow well-established 
and clear statements of state law articulated by them. For example, 
in Jackson v. Chew,115 decided in 1827, the Supreme Court 
adopted state court decisions as authoritative because they settled 
state law. In Green v. Lessee of Neal, the Court found that state 
judicial decisions, when settled by a series of decisions by state 
courts, “have always governed this Court.”116 The precise rule 
being declared is not always clear. In Green the Court apparently 
relies in part on the correctness of the state judicial 
interpretation,117 making it uncertain whether the authoritativeness 
of a state decision depends on its persuasiveness. Also unclear was 
whether a settled pattern of lower state court decisions bound 
federal courts or whether only state supreme court decisions did.118 
Federal courts also differed as to when state law was settled and 
whether a matter was considered governed by state law.119 
                                                                                                         
accompanying note adds that the statement was written before Erie overruled 
Swift.  Id. at 332 n.9. 
115 25 U.S, (12 Wheat.) 153 (1827). 
116 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 127; see also Daniel H. Chamberlain, The State Judiciary–
Its Place in the American Constitutional System, in CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES AS SEEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW 239, 
261-62, 265-66 (1889) (Green requires federal court deference only when state 
judicial interpretation is settled.). 
117 See id. (“In Tennessee, the question arising in this cause, after considerable 
discussion, seems to have been finally settled on principles which are thought 
entirely correct.”) (emphasis added)); but see D’Wolf v. Rabaud, 26 U.S. (1 
Pet.) 476, 502 (1828) (state law rule admitting parol evidence is binding on 
federal courts whether or not is it a “reasonable doctrine”). 
118 See, e.g., Jackson, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 162 (rule uniformly followed by 
the Supreme Court requires following rules of real property “settled in the State 
Courts”); see also infra note 120. 
119 See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Maritime Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1513, 1536-37 (1984). Areas considered “local” were governed by state law; 
“general” areas were not always treated that way. See infra note 192. For the 
difficulty of identifying the category of “local” law, see George Rutherglen, 
Custom and Usage as Action Under Color of State Law: An Essay on the 
Forgotten Terms of Section 1983, 89 VA. L. REV. 925, 933-34 (2003) 
(describing how category of local custom was narrowed to geographically 
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However, precedent was understood to require federal court 
deference to established state judicial expositions of state law.120 In 
requiring federal courts to follow state supreme court articulations 
of state law, Erie simply honored established precedent.  
Corbin’s view rejects it. Even if state supreme court 
decisions are settled, they still are only “persuasive data,” not 
authoritative statements of state law. Other sources can supply 
even better evidence of that law. For instance, Corbin’s list of 
sources of state law includes even the case law of other 
jurisdictions. Thus, it is possible that a state’s supreme court has 
announced a particular rule of state law in deciding a pattern of 
cases; at the same time, the trend among jurisdictions might be 
contrary to this rule. For example, suppose a state supreme court’s 
established, but old, precedent requires privity for a manufacturer 
to be liable to a third parties for injuries caused them by its 
products. The pronounced trend in case law in other jurisdictions 
does not require privity in these circumstances. Corbin would 
allow that in principle because this trend could better evidence 
state law than the state’s settled decisions. A federal court, taking 
account of the trend, could conclude properly that the state 
supreme court opinions did not accurately reflect state law. 
On the facts of the example, the First Circuit in Mason v. 
American Emery Wheel Works121 reached the same conclusion. 
The Mason court found that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s old 
rule requiring privity did not reflect current Mississippi law. 
According to the court, “it is not necessary that a case be explicitly 
overruled in order to lose its persuasive force as an indication of 
what the law is.”122 Other considerations may show that an earlier 
decision no longer has binding force. The clear trend among 
jurisdictions eliminating the requirement of privity, along with the 
Mississippi Supreme Court’s favorable reference to this trend, 
convinced the Mason court that Mississippi law no longer required 
                                                                                                         
limited practices). 
120 See, e.g., Hinde v. Lessee of Vattier, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 398, 401 (1831); United 
States v. Morrison, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 124, 137 (1830) (federal courts bound to 
follow settled state supreme court decisions on state law); Beach v. Viles, 27 
U.S. (2 Pet.) 675, 678 (1829); Gardner v. Colllins, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 58, 85 
(1829); 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 604, 613 (1828); Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) 152, 159 (1825) (bound to follow settled state judicial decisions on state 
law). 
121 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957). 
122 Id. at 909; cf. Carlton v. Worcester, 923 F.2d 1, 3 n.8 (1st Cir. 1991); In re 
Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (D. 
Mass. 1975) (explicit overruling unnecessary). 
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privity. Thus, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s earlier decision, 
although not overruled, did not accurately describe current state 
law. The Mason court predicted that the Mississippi Supreme 
Court, when given the opportunity, would revise its rule.123 
However, the prediction is based on its determination of current 
Mississippi law: the Mississippi Supreme Court will revise its 
former rule because Mississippi law no longer requires privity. The 
Mason court therefore did not determine current Mississippi law 
concerning privity based on its prediction about the rule that the 
Mississippi Supreme Court would adopt.  
Corbin rejects federal court deference based partly on his 
understanding of the common law. In his view a state’s common 
law is the product of a series of judicial decisions made over time. 
The decisions are accompanied by written judicial opinions 
formulating rules or doctrines that explain the decisions. The rules 
or doctrines themselves are distilled from prior opinions and 
decisions; Corbin describes them variously as “generalizations,” 
“tentative generalizations” and “tentative working rules”124 from 
cases. For Corbin, these general propositions rationalize case 
outcomes but do not bind subsequent courts.125 Over time, 
common law rules and doctrine change to reflect changes in case 
outcomes and their accompanying opinions. General propositions 
stated in a judicial opinion therefore may not continue to 
accurately rationalize subsequent case outcomes.      
This description of state common law contains two 
different observations. One is that a court’s statement of the 
operative rule or doctrine is fallible. If common law rules are 
“generalizations” distilled from previous cases, a state court’s 
formulation of the operative rule can be mistaken. As a “tentative” 
generalization, a court’s statement explaining its decision might 
rationalize the result incorrectly. Thus, reliance on other sources, 
such as the opinions of other state courts and “mores and practices 
of the community,” can produce a more accurate statement of the 
operative rule or doctrine. The second observation concerns the 
change in rules and doctrines. If case outcomes and accompanying 
opinions change over time, even initially accurate state court 
statements of state common law can inaccurately describe 
subsequent law. Fallibility in stating the operative common law 
and the evolution of common law rules together makes federal 
                                                
123 Mason, 241 F.2d at 910. 
124 See 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 5 (1950); 6 CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS 358 (1950). 
125 See Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 772. 
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court deference to state supreme court interpretations of state law 
inappropriate. 
There are competing conceptions of the common law, and 
Corbin’s description relies on one of them. One view understands 
the common law to include the judicial opinions deciding cases or 
at least the general propositions recited in them that rationalize 
decisions. It considers the rules or doctrines expressed in opinions 
as authoritative and therefore binding on subsequent courts. The 
view thereby gives judicial opinions or parts of them the status of 
law, similar in effect to legislative enactments. A competing 
conception of the common law considers judicial opinions 
accompanying decisions merely as explanations of the decisions, 
not themselves part of the common law. It therefore denies that the 
general propositions recited in opinions are authoritative for 
subsequent courts. Emphasizing the absence of a canonical 
formulation of common law rules, the view rejects the notion that 
judicial opinions are part of the common law.126  
Corbin’s description of the common law employs the latter 
conception. Rules expressed in opinions are “tentative 
generalizations” that are fallible explanations of decisions and do 
not bind subsequent courts. An opinion’s rationalizations of a 
decision “are not legislative enactments, general in application. 
They are merely ‘persuasive data.’”127 General propositions in an 
opinion can be merely persuasive, not authoritative, only if judicial 
opinions are not themselves part of the common law. The text of 
an opinion is in this respect unlike the products of legislative 
enactments, which are part of statutory law. Corbin’s working 
notion of state common law makes sense of some otherwise 
puzzling questions posed in his 1938 note on Erie. The note asks 
whether the result in Erie means that there is “an omnipresence 
brooding over the state of Pennsylvania.”128 It goes on to ask 
Socratically whether Erie permits a federal court judge applying 
Pennsylvania law to go outside the opinions of the Pennsylvania 
                                                
126 Cf. Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years at Law, supra note 92, at 190. For descriptions 
of these two competing conceptions of the common law, see Michael S. Moore, 
Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 183, 
184-85 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law 
and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (Second Series) 77, 
88-89 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973). For the implication of these two conceptions 
for executive branch obligations to defer to judicial interpretations of law, see 
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for 
Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993). 
127 Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 772. 
128 See Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 92, at 1352. 
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Supreme Court.129 Given Brandeis’s explicit denial of the 
“brooding” status of law, Corbin’s questions appear puzzling. They 
are understandable if Erie regards the text of judicial opinions as 
part of a state’s common law. If Pennsylvania’s common law 
includes these texts, Pennsylvania state law is given a canonical 
expression that may not accurately rationalize the rules at work in 
cases applying Pennsylvania law or reflect their evolution. As a 
canonical expression of state common law, judicial opinions are 
“an omnipresence brooding” over the law of Pennsylvania. Thus, if 
Erie requires a federal court applying Pennsylvania law to follow 
interpretations of Pennsylvania law contained in Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court opinions, the court in effect treats part of state 
common law (judicial opinions) as “an omnipresence brooding” 
over Pennsylvania. If so, the 1938 note concludes, Erie’s 
requirement is a “direction to substitute an omnipresence brooding 
over Pennsylvania alone, in place of the roc-like bird whose wings 
have been believed to overspread forty-eight states . . . .”130 In 
other words, it is a mistake to include as part of state common law 
judicial opinions (the “omnipresence”) accompanying decisions. 
The common law instead consists only of general propositions that 
explain a series of decisions (the “roc-like bird”). 
A conception of the common law does not by itself compel 
a conclusion about federal court deference to state supreme court 
opinions. This is because federal courts may be bound by these 
opinions whether or not judicial opinions are part of state common 
law. For instance, Brandeis’s opinion in Erie accepts Holmes’s 
conclusion in Black & White Taxicab that respect for state 
allocations of law-declaring authority requires federal courts to 
follow state supreme court opinions.131 Although their conclusion 
is easily justified if a state court’s opinions are considered part of 
state common law, the same conclusion still can justified relying 
on a competing conception of common law. After all, respect for 
state allocations of law-declaring authority can require respecting a 
state court’s statement of state law. A state court’s statement of 
state law need not itself be regarded as part of the law of that state. 
Thus, a federal court may be bound by state supreme court 
opinions as authoritative interpretations of state law, even if those 
interpretations are not themselves part of that law. The rejection of 
federal court deference therefore requires more than just a 
                                                
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 1353. 
131 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79. 
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conception of the common law. Some reason for finding the 
exercise of independent judgment about state law appropriate must 
be supplied.  
Corbin’s case against federal court deference does not rely 
only on a conception of the common law. It also relies on two 
different sorts of considerations that Corbin finds makes the 
exercise of independent judgment of state law appropriate. One 
sort is practical objections to Erie’s requirement of federal court 
deference based on the requirement’s consequences for judicial 
reasoning. The other consideration finds the exercise of 
independent judgment of state law by federal courts to be 
constitutionally permissible. The next Part describes Corbin’s 
practical objections and Part V his constitutional considerations. 
 
IV.  THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL COURT 
DEFERENCE                 
 
Corbin takes Erie’s requirement of federal court deference 
to apply generally. It not only demands that a federal court in a 
diversity case follow the state supreme court’s interpretation of 
state law. He reads the case also to demand that the court follow 
inferior state court interpretations of state law that are authoritative 
within that state. The principal purpose of The Laws of the Several 
States is to assess the Supreme Court’s application of “the doctrine 
expressed in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins” to cases in which state 
law had been interpreted only by inferior state courts.132 A 1953 
book review in which Corbin called for Erie’s overruling refers to 
the case’s “insufferable progeny,” clearly intending the reference 
to include the same cases.133 And a later article describes Erie as 
telling federal courts that “they must accept the rules laid down by 
a State Court, even though enunciated by a single Vice-Chancellor 
whom no other State judge is bound to follow.”134 Corbin assesses 
Erie understanding the case to bind federal courts to authoritative 
interpretations of state law by all state courts.        
He rejects Erie based in part on consequences of federal 
court deference he finds objectionable. Erie’s general requirement 
                                                
132 See Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, supra note 69, at 766. 
133 Arthur L. Corbin, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United 
States, 62 YALE L.J. 1137, 1144 (1953) (book review) [hereinafter Corbin, 1953 
Book Review]. 
134 Corbin, A Creative Process, supra note 91, at 14, 15. Corbin’s description of 
Erie here is based on his interpretation of Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field. See 
infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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of deference creates an asymmetry in the way in which federal and 
state courts determine state law applicable to the same sort of case. 
As Corbin understands the case, federal courts must follow the 
interpretation of state law announced by state courts. The state 
supreme courts, however, and sometimes coequal inferior state 
courts, are not bound by their own interpretations of state law. 
Unlike federal courts, they can treat their prior interpretations of 
state law merely as persuasive data. This difference in authoritative 
sources of state law can produce a lack of uniformity in case 
outcomes between federal and state courts. For Corbin, this result 
is objectionable when both courts are determining the same 
applicable state law in relevantly similar cases.  
Before Erie overruled Swift, Corbin believed that the 
pressure for uniformity induced federal courts to articulate general 
common law in a way consistent with state court construals of the 
same law.135 He initially thought that Erie would not affect this 
tendency toward uniformity in interpreting state law. By 1941, 
Corbin noticed a divergence in the interpretation of state law 
between federal and state courts that he believed resulted from 
Erie’s requirement of federal court deference. To avoid the 
consequence, he rejected Erie’s requirement of deference. The 
federal court instead “must use its judicial brains, not a pair of 
scissors and a paste pot.”136 It must determine applicable state law 
in the same way state courts do so, using the same sources of law 
available to state courts. By 1953, Corbin apparently found that 
Erie’s requirement of federal court deference produced this 
divergence in a sufficient number of cases to call for Erie’s 
overruling.137  
                                                
135 See 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 830, at 332 (1950); Corbin, The Common 
Law of the United States, supra note 92, at 1352. 
136 Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 775. 
137 See Corbin, 1953 Book Review, supra note 133, at 1144 (referring to “harmful 
results” of the Erie decision). Corbin nowhere explains why, or how, Erie’s 
requirement of deference to state court interpretations produced less uniformity 
in interpretation than under Swift. He simply asserts it. There is an initial 
question as to the degree of divergence Swift produced in the first place. Earlier 
assessments of Swift’s effects on uniformity in interpretation reached divergent 
conclusions. Frankfurter found a lack of uniformity between federal and state 
courts, based on a small sample of cases; See Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of 
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 
529 n.150 (1928). Brandeis’s opinion in Erie relies on Frankurter’s finding. See 
Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 n.6. Others concluded that Swift produced significant 
uniformity eventually. See Arthur John Keeffe et al., Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL 
L. Q. 494, 504 (1949) (uniformity eventual; effect not immediate). Yet another 
conclusion found uniformity between federal and state court interpretations 
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The proximate cause of Corbin’s rejection of Erie was a 
group of four cases decided by the Supreme Court during its 1940 
term.138 All of the cases involved questions of state law. In three of 
them, the relevant law had been interpreted by state intermediate 
courts. In the fourth case, two trial courts had interpreted the 
applicable state law. None of the respective state supreme courts 
had construed the relevant state law. The Supreme Court had to 
decide in each case whether Erie required a federal court in a 
diversity case to follow the interpretations of state law expressed 
by lower state courts.   
Corbin understands the Court’s opinions in the group of 
cases to require federal court deference in these circumstances. For 
instance, he concludes that the result in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. 
Field binds a federal court “to accept a statement of state law, upon 
the basis of which a decision is made, even if it is made by a single 
judge in an inferior state court . . . .”139 West v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.’s formulation of the federal court’s 
obligation supports this conclusion.140 However, Corbin’s reading 
                                                                                                         
under Swift when the Supreme Court interpreted state law; see Cole v. 
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 43 F.2d 953, 956-67 (2d Cir. 1930); FELIX 
FRANKFURTER & WILBER G. KATZ, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 166 n.1 (1931) (citing Cole 
approvingly). The findings are based on informal surveys of case law, and may 
involve biased samplings of cases. See Hessel E. Yntema & George H. Jaffin, 
Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 869, 881 
n.23 (1931). Corbin apparently believed that Erie’s application produced less 
uniform interpretations than under Swift. The question is why. Crosskey thought 
that federal courts under Swift interpreted federal common law uniformly. Erie 
eliminated that uniformity. See 2 CROSSKEY, infra note 616, at 917-18. Because 
Corbin rejects federal common law (see Corbin, The Common Law of the United 
States, supra note 92, at 1351), the elimination of uniformity among federal 
courts in interpreting federal common law cannot be among the “harmful 
results” of Erie Corbin refers to in his book review of Crosskey’s, Politics and 
the Constitution in the History of the United States. See Corbin, 1953 Book 
Review, supra note 133, at 1144. A source of divergence in interpretation might 
be produced by Erie, as Corbin understood the case. If Erie requires federal 
courts to defer to inferior state court interpretations of state law, while state law 
does not treat those interpretations as having precedential effect, then a federal 
court could be bound to interpret state law in a way that does not bind inferior 
state courts. In such instances divergent interpretations of state law could be 
produced. 
138 See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); Six Cos. v. Joint 
Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); West v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223 
(1940); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940). 
139 Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 767. 
140 See West, 311 U.S. at 236, 238 (“A state is not without law save as its highest 
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ignores language in Field, which he quoted, to the effect that 
deference to the interpretations of lower state courts is required “in 
the absence of more convincing evidence of what the state law 
is.”141 This qualifying language, with comparable phrases in the 
other cases,142 creates only a rebuttable presumption in favor of the 
lower state court interpretations of state law. Interpretations by 
lower state courts are not binding on federal courts, unlike 
construals of state law articulated by state supreme courts. By 
ignoring the qualification, Corbin transforms a rebuttable 
presumption into a requirement of unqualified deference to lower 
state court construals of state law.143 So transformed, the 
requirement serves as a foil for Corbin’s proposal that state court 
opinions are merely “persuasive data” and that federal courts still 
must use their “judicial brains.” In fact, Corbin’s proposal treats 
state court interpretations as having no presumptive effect. Federal 
courts, according to it, are to use the same sources to determine 
state law as are available to state courts.144 A more charitable 
understanding of the set of cases might therefore see the dispute as 
one over the wisdom of the presumption set by the Court. These 
cases set a presumption in favor of lower state court construals of 
state law; Corbin’s proposal gives state court opinions no 
presumptive effect. Corbin does not see the dispute this way 
because he understands Erie to require federal court deference to 
inferior state court interpretations of state law.  
Nothing in Corbin’s subsequent references to his 
assessment of the group of 1940 cases suggests that he changed his 
view of them. He continued to cite the assessment approvingly in 
later articles and in Corbin on Contracts. A 1959 article still 
                                                                                                         
court has declared it. There are many rules of decision commonly accepted and 
acted upon by the bar and inferior courts which are nevertheless laws of the state 
although the highest court has never passed upon them . . . . In the meantime the 
state law applicable to these parties and in this case has been authoritatively 
declared by the highest state court in which a decision could be had.”). 
141 Field, 311 U.S. at 178; Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 767. Oddly, 
Corbin quotes Field’s qualifying language (Field, 311 U.S. at 771) but still 
understands the case as requiring deference to all authoritative state court 
interpretations of state law. 
142 See West, 311 U.S. at 237 (“unless it is convinced by other persuasive data”); 
Six Companies, 311 U.S. at 188 (“no convincing evidence that the law of the 
State is otherwise”); Stoner, 311 U.S. at 468 (no indication that the “Missouri 
Supreme Court would decide this case differently”). 
143 For the same move, see Clark, supra note 105, at 267; 2 CROSSKEY, infra 
note 161, at 919-920.   
144 See 6 CORBIN, supra note 124, at § 831 (p. 332); Corbin, Several States, 
supra note 69, at 774. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss1/4
2010] Before the Jurisprudential Turn 
 
117 
describes Erie as requiring federal court deference to state trial 
court construal of state law.145 There also is indirect evidence 
suggesting that he maintained his understanding of Erie. King v. 
Order of United Commercial Travelers of America146 held that 
federal courts in diversity cases did not have to follow the 
interpretations of inferior state trial courts when the decisions of 
those courts did not have precedential effect under state law. King 
explicitly left undisturbed the “general rule” that federal courts 
must follow the interpretations of state law made by state courts.147 
The case was decided in 1947, after The Laws of the Several States 
appeared in the Yale Law Journal. Corbin’s practice was to 
annotate in his bound copies of the Journal the articles he 
published there,148 usually adding citations to relevant cases 
decided after the articles appeared. His annotations to The Laws of 
the Several States contain references to cases decided up to 1951 
but not to King. King clearly is relevant to Corbin’s article, and 
Corbin’s apparent thoroughness in surveying case law makes it 
unlikely that he was unfamiliar with the decision.149 A fair 
inference from King’s omission from Corbin’s annotations is that 
Corbin did not think the case jeopardized his understanding of the 
group of cases discussed in The Law of the Several States. He 
probably continued to believe that Erie required a general 
deference to state court interpretations of state law and that such 
deference had objectionable consequences.150    
                                                
145 See Corbin, A Creative Process, supra note 86, at 15; see also Corbin, supra 
note 126, at 1140-41 (Court has told federal judges that they must accept “the 
words of a Vice-Chancellor or of a trial judge in a county court, even though no 
other court in the United States is bound to do so.”). Corbin’s contemporaries 
shared his view of Erie’s implications for federal court deference. See, e.g., 
Moore & Oglebay, supra note 109, at 525 (“Now, in light of the Tompkins case 
on a non-federal matter, the federal courts must follow state law, whether 
statutory or case-made.”). 
146 333 U.S. 153 (1947). 
147 Id. at 162. Other commentators understood the opinion in this way. See, e.g., 
Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie 
Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L. J. 187, 210 (1957) (King concludes that 
high court and intermediary state courts decisions regularly binding on federal 
courts). But cf. PURCELL, supra note 11, at 215 (King “modified” while still 
reaffirming Field’s rule requiring federal court deference.). 
148 See Michael C. Dorf, Bibliography of the Published Writings of Arthur 
Linton Corbin, 74 YALE L. J. 312, 314 (1964). 
149 See Restatement of the Common Law, supra note 97, at 187-188. Crosskey 
critically discusses King in a work reviewed by Corbin; see Corbin, supra note 
126 (Crosskey’s discussion occurs in 2 CROSSKEY, infra note 161, at 926-27). 
150 Corbin usually is thought to have misunderstood Erie’s implication for 
inferior state judicial opinions on state law. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, In 
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Corbin’s understanding of Erie’s implications must be 
separated from his objection to the case. This is because his 
objection remains even if the case does not have the implications 
                                                                                                         
Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 
400 (1964); Dorf, supra note 3, at 698; but see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations 
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 510 (1954) 
[hereinafter Hart, Relations] (describing Supreme Court’s holding in the group 
of 1940 cases as requiring deference to “an obviously unsound decision” of a 
state trial court of state-wide jurisdiction). It is not so clear that he 
misunderstood its implication. The case has come to stand for the proposition 
that federal courts must follow state supreme court expositions of state law. 
Erie’s facts included an interpretation of Pennsylvania law by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, so that the Supreme Court had to decide whether the federal 
district court was bound by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Pennsylvania law. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. But the logic of Brandeis’s 
reasoning arguably extends to the authoritative interpretations of state law by 
any state court. It requires federal court deference to these authoritative 
interpretations. Brandeis relies on Holmes’s view in Black & White Taxicab Co. 
that federal courts must respect state allocations of lawmaking power and that 
state constitutions are assumed to authorize their supreme courts to make law. 
See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. (Brandeis’s opinion does not refer to 
Holmes’s assumption.) Inferior state courts make state law according to both 
Holmes and Brandeis because, for them, all judicial decisions make law. 
Holmes’s assumption of an authorization to make law does not apply to inferior 
state courts. However, federal courts must respect inferior state judicial 
interpretations where states otherwise authorize their inferior courts to make 
law. It is just that the inference to authorization is not available based on 
Holmes’s assumption. Thus, Erie requires federal court deference to inferior 
state judicial interpretations of state law when evidence of state authorization is 
available. Deference is not automatic, but Erie requires it in this case. Erie’s 
facts happen to describe an instance in which deference is automatic because the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had interpreted Pennsylvania law. Deference still 
is required in cases in which authoritative judicial statements of state law exist. 
Corbin could have though (reasonably) that states authorize at least some of 
their inferior courts to make law, as evidenced by the precedential effect given 
the opinions of these courts, legislative, and executive respect for the contents of 
the their judicial opinions, and the like. He therefore could conclude that Erie 
required federal court deference in the group of 1940 cases.  
   In fact, in King the Supreme Court acknowledges that states consider some 
inferior state courts’ decisions as authoritative of state law. See supra 139 and 
accompanying text; see also Kurland, supra note 140. In that case the Court 
suggested in dicta that federal courts are bound by the interpretations state law 
articulated by these courts. See King, 333 U.S. at 162. In Commission v. Estate 
of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967), the Court later announced that Erie only 
requires federal courts to defer to a state supreme court’s interpretation of its 
law. This arguably reflects an altered understanding, not a “clarification,” of 
Erie’s implication with respect to inferior state court interpretations of state law. 
Thus, Corbin might have been right about Erie’s unaltered implication. 
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Corbin finds. The Supreme Court, in cases decided after Corbin’s 
death, has explained that federal courts are required to follow only 
state supreme court articulations of state law.151 State lower court 
interpretations at most are presumptive guides to state law and do 
not bind federal courts. The Court’s clarification of Erie’s 
requirement therefore removes the basis for Corbin’s criticism of 
the group of cases decided in the Court’s 1940 term. However, 
Corbin’s objection to Erie remains unaffected by this later 
clarification. Erie requires federal courts to defer to state supreme 
court interpretations of state law, and this requirement produces the 
asymmetry in judicial reasoning Corbin finds objectionable. 
Federal courts and state supreme courts still must determine 
applicable state law differently: the federal court are bound by state 
supreme court interpretations while the state supreme court is not 
itself bound by its own prior pronouncements. 
This difference in turn can produce differences in outcomes 
between federal courts and state supreme courts in otherwise 
relevantly similar cases. Although Erie’s required deference, as 
clarified by the Court, produces potentially fewer occasions in 
which divergent outcomes occur, because federal courts are not 
required to reason about state law differently from lower state 
courts. The divergence in judicial reasoning, however, still exists 
between federal courts and state supreme courts, and therefore 
Corbin’s objection remains. Corbin was concerned about this 
divergence, not just a divergence in interpretations between federal 
courts and lower state courts. His 1938 note asks whether Erie 
prohibited a federal court judge in Pennsylvania from going 
“outside the opinions of the judges of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania.”152 The contention of The Laws of the Several States 
is that a federal court in any diversity case must use the same 
“persuasive data” to determine state law as state courts,153 and 
Corbin later goes on to deny that state supreme court opinions bind 
federal courts.154      
The response to Corbin’s objection is curious. Courts and 
commentators accept the approach Corbin proposes federal courts 
should take to determine state law while ignoring the objection 
upon which the proposal is based. In doing so, they ignore the full 
implications of Corbin’s proposal for the interpretation of state law 
in diversity cases. Corbin proposes that federal courts construe all 
                                                
151 See Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465. 
152 Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 92, at 1352. 
153 Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 771. 
154 Id. at 772. 
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state court interpretations of state law merely as “persuasive data” 
because he finds that federal court deference has objectionable 
consequences for judicial reasoning about state law. Commentators 
and courts see the proposal as consistent with Erie’s required 
deference. Henry Friendly, for instance, finds “[n]othing in the 
Erie opinion [that] gives the slightest basis for thinking Brandeis 
would have disagreed with Professor Corbin’s comment that it 
could not have been intended that the federal judges were ‘being 
directed to act differently from the Pennsylvania judges 
themselves.’”155 Friendly qualifies his finding in a note conceding 
that Erie requires deference in the case of state supreme court 
opinions. The qualification is fatal to Friendly’s view that Erie’s 
required deference is consistent with Corbin’s proposal.156 A more 
recent variant of the same view is expressed by Michael Dorf, who 
finds that Erie requires deference to lower state court opinions 
because they provide reliable guides for predicting how state 
supreme courts will rule.157 In this way Erie requires federal courts 
to treat state court interpretations as authoritative in the same that 
state courts must treat them. Dorf’s view is implausible because 
Corbin’s recommendation denies that any “juristic data” have 
presumptive effect or that the “data” be used to predict how the 
state supreme court will rule. A presumption in favor of state court 
interpretations creates the asymmetry in judicial reasoning between 
state and federal courts that Corbin rejects. Corbin’s proposal 
denies, while Erie requires, deference to state supreme court 
interpretations of state law. Federal courts avoid the inconsistency 
by endorsing Corbin’s proposal while not applying it to state 
supreme court opinions.158  
 
V.     CORBIN’S CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR OVERRULING Erie      
 
Corbin does not just think that the deference Erie requires 
has objectionable consequences for judicial reasoning about state 
law. He also rejects Erie’s requirement on constitutional grounds. 
                                                
155 See Friendly, supra note 150, at 400 (quoting Corbin, The Common Law of 
the United States, supra note 87, at 1352). 
156 Friendly, supra note 150, at 400 n.76. 
157 See Dorf, supra note 3, at 698. Dorf makes the suggestion based on the 
Court’s later understanding of Erie. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
158 For favorable judicial reception of Corbin’s proposal, see, for example, 
White v. United States, 680 F.2d 1156, 1161 n.9 (7th Cir. 1982); Young v. Ethyl 
Corp., 521 F.2d 771, 773 n.4 (8th Cir. 1975); In re E. & S. Dists. Asbestos 
Litig., 772 F.Supp. 1380, 1389 (E.D.N.Y 1991). 
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Erie concludes that federal courts are constitutionally barred from 
making judgments about state law independent of state supreme 
court interpretations of that law. Corbin denies this; he thinks 
federal courts have the constitutional power to do so.159 Unlike his 
practical objections to Erie’s requirement of federal court 
deference, Corbin’s constitutional objections to the case developed 
gradually and are never stated in detail. The 1938 note simply 
asserts that federal courts have the same “constitutional power” as 
state courts to determine state law. The Laws of the Several States 
repeats the assertion, but neither piece argues that Erie should be 
overruled. Corbin called for Erie’s “prompt overruling” in a 1953 
book review of William Crosskey’s, Politics and the Constitution 
in the History of the United States. Supplements to Corbin on 
Contracts referred to Crosskey’s “convincing arguments” against 
Erie’s constitutionality and quoted approvingly (with insignificant 
change) Crosskey’s conclusion that Erie was “the most colossal 
error ever committed by the U.S. Supreme Court.”160  
 
A. Corbin and Crosskey 
      In 1953, Crosskey published Politics and the Constitution 
in the History of the United States.161 The book’s approach to 
constitutional interpretation is originalist: the Constitution should 
be understood and enforced consistent with the way linguistically 
competent and well-informed people understood its contents when 
the document was adopted.162 According to Crosskey, the 
                                                
159 Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 92, at 1353. 
160 See 1964 Pocket Part, 4 CORBIN, supra note 114, at § 830 (p. 104). See 2 
CROSSKEY, infra note 161, at 907 (Erie as “the most colossal error the Supreme 
Court has ever made”). Corbin authored the 1964 Supplement. See Letter from 
Arthur Corbin to Robert Braucher, January 28, 1966, reprinted in Perillo, supra 
note 15, at 776-777. 
161 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953) (two vols.). 
162 See, e.g., 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 161, at vii, 13. Crosskey’s version of 
originalism, as applied, also required fidelity to the intention of the framers in 
adopting particular constitutional provisions. See, e.g., id. at 1000 (judicial 
review not intended or provided for in the Constitution). More recent versions of 
originalism have distinguished between the original intent of the framers in 
adopting particular constitutional provisions and the original meaning attached 
to the language in those provisions by linguistically competent speakers. Within 
original meaning, a distinction in turn can be made been the meaning the 
framers attached to provisions from the meaning competent contemporaries 
attached to them. For a brief history of originalism, see Vasan Kesavan & 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113, 1134-48 (2003); cf. Randy E. Barnett, An 
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Constitution was understood to describe a national government 
with strong central powers and strict separations of powers 
allocated between the institutions of that government. Politics and 
the Constitution in the United States argued for four main 
conclusions: (1) Congress has the general power to regulate all 
commerce, including purely intrastate commercial activity; (2) 
Congress had plenary legislative power not limited to powers 
enumerated in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution or by powers 
retained by the states; (3) the Supreme Court had power to review 
Congressional acts only when they raise issues of due process or 
interfere with the exercise of the Court’s own constitutional 
powers; and (4) the Court has supremacy over both federal and 
state courts, including on matters of state law, in cases in which the 
Court has jurisdiction.163 The last conclusion meant that the Court 
has final authority over matters of both federal and state law in all 
cases in which it has appellate jurisdiction. Thus, in diversity cases 
in both federal and state courts, the Court ultimately could declare 
state law independently of its determination by the state’s courts. 
Lower federal court created by Congress therefore had the same 
power.      
Today Crosskey’s conclusions generally are rejected and 
his views considered idiosyncratic. The contemporary response to 
his book was similarly negative. Most of the prominent book 
reviews of Politics and the Constitution in the United States were 
highly critical, taking issue with one or more of Crosskey’s 
theses.164 Of the very few favorable reviews,165 Corbin’s is by the 
far the most enthusiastic.166 Most of Corbin’s short review is 
                                                                                                         
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620-23 (1999). 
Originalism, as characterized in the text, only requires fidelity to the original 
meaning attached to words by linguistically competent speakers.   
163 See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 161, at 77, 117 ((1)); 393f ((2)); 2 CROSSKEY, 
supra note 161, at 1000, 1004-05 ((3)); 655-659 ((4)). 
164 See Ernest J. Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1954); Julius 
Goebel, Jr., Ex Parte Clio, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (1954); Henry M. Hart, Jr., 
Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456 (1954). See 
also Hart, Relations, supra note 150, at 500-504; HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 168 n.1 (1994; org. tent. ed. 1958) 
(Crosskey’s view of Constitution as describing a unitary system of government 
giving plenary power to Congress “unorthodox” and “wholly untenable.”). 
165 See Charles E. Clark, Professor Crosskey and the Brooding Omnipresence of 
Erie-Tompkins, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 24 (1953); Malcolm Sharp, Book Review, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 439 (1954); Walton H. Hamilton, The Constitution–Apropos of 
Crosskey, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 79 (1953). 
166 See Corbin, 1953 Book Review, supra note 133. Corbin later described 
Crosskey’s book as “remarkable.” See 4 CORBIN, supra note 135, at 118 (1964 
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concerned with Crosskey’s discussion of Erie, which it describes 
as “destroy[ing] the supposed constitutional basis for the 
decision.”167 Without discussing Crosskey’s criticisms of Erie, the 
review concludes that “it will be impossible to show any material 
error” in Crosskey’s demonstration of Erie’s harmful results and 
that no other writer has presented “so convincing a criticism of . . 
. ‘one of the most grossly unconstitutional governmental acts in 
the nation’s entire history.’”168 The review ends by supporting 
Crosskey’s call for Erie to be overruled and defending Crosskey 
against anticipated (unspecified) criticisms.    
The perfunctory character of the book review makes it a 
poor source for determining Corbin’s constitutional objections to 
Erie. The review does not disclose the constitutional basis for his 
objections. Clearly the review’s call for Erie’s overruling reaffirms 
Corbin’s view, earlier expressed in The Laws of the Several States 
and intimated in his 1938 note, that federal courts have the 
authority to make independent judgments about state law. It just 
makes explicit what Corbin’s previous criticisms of Erie signaled 
but left implicit. But it cannot be assumed that Corbin’s approval 
of Crosskey’s conclusion about Erie’s constitutionality extended to 
Crosskey’s constitutional grounds for this conclusion. Corbin 
probably did not share Crosskey’s constitutional criticisms of Erie. 
There are too many differences in the positions taken by the two to 
safely attribute all of Crosskey’s criticisms to him.          
For one thing, Corbin does not share Crosskey’s approach 
to constitutional interpretation. He rejects originalism. His 1938 
note doubts that a historical understanding of either the 1789 
Judiciary Act or the constitutional powers of federal powers is 
either knowable or necessary.169 The one point on which Corbin’s 
very favorable book review disagrees with Crosskey is over 
constitutional interpretation. For Corbin, contract interpretation 
requires ascertaining the meaning the contracting parties attach to 
the contract’s terms.170 Constitutional interpretation, for him, must 
be made in changed circumstances and is “the continuous function 
                                                                                                         
Supp.). 
167 Id. at 1140. 
168 Id. at 1141 (the critical description of Erie Corbin quotes approvingly is 
Crosskey’s; see 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 161, at 916). 
169 Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 92, at 1353. 
170 Corbin adopts a subjective standard of contract interpretation; see 3 ARTHUR 
L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 542 (1950); Arthur L. Corbin, The 
Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 
189 (1965). 
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of men living in those later times, particularly judges.”171 Neither 
sort of interpretation aims at ascertaining the historical meaning 
attached to constitutional provisions, as Crosskey’s orginalism 
requires. This is why Corbin finds it unnecessary to ascertain the 
normal understanding of the Constitution’s provisions by readers at 
the time of its enactment or by the framers.    
Another difference concerns an implication of Crosskey’s 
position which Corbin rejects. Relying on the “vesting” clause’s 
reference to a “supreme” court in Article III, Section 1 of the 
Constitution, Crosskey concludes that the Supreme Court 
controlled a national judicial system of both federal and state 
courts. The Court’s appellate jurisdiction cases allows it to resolve 
questions of both federal and state law that arose in diversity cases 
appealed to it or in any case in which it had jurisdiction. According 
to Crosskey, the judicial “supremacy” of the Court means that in 
these cases it is not bound by interpretations of state law 
enunciated by state courts.172 The Court’s “supremacy” for him 
also means that its resolution of legal issues is authoritative: once 
articulated, state courts must follow the Court’s interpretation of 
law, including state law. Corbin rejects this last implication. State 
courts properly may determine state law independently of federal 
court determinations of that law, just as federal courts’ 
determination of state law may do so independently of state court 
determination of state law. The Law of the Several States finds that 
even a state law rule established by a state supreme court is not 
binding on other courts.173 The rule does not compel a result 
beyond the case in which it was announced. Unlike a statute, it 
serves as merely “persuasive data” of state law for other courts.174 
Because the Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law also is not 
a statutory enactment, it too can serve merely as “persuasive data” 
for state courts. Thus, for Corbin, the Court’s interpretations of 
state law cannot be authoritative for state courts. Corbin therefore 
cannot recognize the judicial supremacy Crosskey gives the 
Supreme Court.              
A final disagreement between Crosskey and Corbin 
concerns the common law. Crosskey views the common law, 
understood historically, as a single system of law received from 
England and adapted by the American colonies.175 As a single 
                                                
171 Corbin, 1953 Book Review, supra note 133, at 1144. 
172 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 161, at 655. 
173 See Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, supra note 69, at 762. 
174 See id. at 762. 
175 See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 161, at 584-85; 607-09. 
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system of law, it is included among the “laws of the United States” 
in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. He concludes that the 
Supreme Court and lower federal courts can authoritatively 
determine the common law in cases within their jurisdiction. This 
includes the authority to independently determine the content of 
common law and bind state courts to these determinations. For 
Crosskey, Supreme Court precedent preceding Swift wrongly 
required state courts to follow federal court determinations of state 
law.176 He faults Swift for not going further to bind state courts to a 
federal court’s interpretation of common law.177 Thus, he would 
extend Swift, not overrule it. Corbin explicitly denies that there is a 
single system of common law.178 He agrees with Erie’s holding 
that there is no federal common law and that Swift was 
appropriately overruled. However, he also believes that federal 
courts properly can make independent––though not binding––
determinations of state law. He therefore rejects Erie’s requirement 
that federal courts defer to state supreme court determinations of 
state law.179 As he stated, “no judge . . . can force a rule upon the 
judges and litigants in other cases by stating it in his written 
opinion.”180 At the same time, unlike Crosskey, he denies that state 
                                                
176 Cf. Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 
427, 444-45 (1958). Crosskey faults Green v. Lessee of Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 
291 (1832), for eliminating the authoritativeness of Supreme Court precedents 
on state law for state courts he found recognized in earlier cases, principally 
Huidekoper’s Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1 (1805). Green held that 
federal courts were bound to follow settled state judicial articulations of state 
law. According to Crosskey, Swift preserved the independence of federal court 
determinations of state law without disturbing Green. See 2 CROSSKEY, supra 
note 161, at 863. Crosskey’s reading of Huidekoper’s Lessee is controversial. 
Fletcher construes its holding more narrowly than Crosskey, as requiring federal 
court deference to state judicial interpretations only when the interpretations are 
well settled. He also understands the case to say nothing about the 
authoritativeness of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law for state 
courts. See Fletcher, supra note 119, at 1533-34. Fletcher describes Crosskey as 
being “alone” in his view of the authoritativeness of Supreme Court 
interpretations of state law for state courts. See id. at 1560 n.224. For a critical 
assessment of the significance Crosskey attaches to Huidekoper’s Lessee, see 
Hart, Relations, supra note 150, at 502 n.33. 
177 See, e.g., 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 161, at 904-09, 1365 n.79. 
178 See Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 92, at 1351; 
Corbin,  Several States, supra note 69, at 774 (“[Swift’s doctrine that there exists 
a federal system of common law] well deserved to be overruled.”). 
179 See Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 771 (contention of article that 
federal court has “sworn duty” to determine state law using same “persuasive 
data” as state court). 
180 Id. at 775. 
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courts are constitutionally bound to follow federal court 
interpretations of state law. For all of the reasons above, Corbin’s 
differences with Crosskey make it unlikely that he shared 
Crosskey’s principal criticisms of Erie.   
 
B. Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and Judicial Independence 
Corbin rejects Erie because he believes that federal courts 
have the constitutional power to make independent determinations 
of state law. The basis of this power, for him, is Article III’s grant 
of jurisdiction to federal courts. Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution extends the judicial power of federal courts to diversity 
cases. In articles predating his book review of Crosskey’s Politics 
and the Constitution, Corbin finds their authority to independently 
determine state law in Article III’s “judicial power” clause. Article 
III’s grant of jurisdiction to federal courts in diversity cases 
therefore allows federal courts to ignore state judicial 
interpretations of state law.  
Corbin took this position even before Erie was decided. In 
an article published in 1929, the year after Black & White Taxicab 
Co. was decided, Corbin responded to Holmes’s dissent in the 
case.181 Corbin’s description of the dissent identifies two assertions 
it makes: that only state common law exists, not federal common 
law, and that it is “an unconstitutional assumption of powers” for a 
federal court to refuse to follow a state’s judicial interpretation of 
state law.182 His response accepts the first assertion while denying 
the second. A state’s common law is determined by “the great 
multitude of adjudications in all the courts that have jurisdiction of 
such citizens and transactions.”183 Against Holmes, he “believes 
that the federal courts are just as fully authorized to declare and 
build up common law in the cases properly arising before them, as 
are the courts of a single state.”184 Clearly Corbin here is supposing 
that Article III is the source the federal court’s authority. Thus, his 
response is that Article III’s jurisdictional grant to federal courts 
does not require them to defer to state court interpretations of state 
common law. It gives them the authority to independently 
determine state law. Corbin later rejects Erie for the same reason 
he rejects Holmes’s dissent in Black & White Taxicab Co.: its 
requirement of federal court deference denies federal courts power 
that Article III gives them.  
                                                
181 See Corbin, Restatement of the Common Law, supra note 97. 
182 See id. at 25. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. (footnote omitted).  
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Why does Corbin think that Article III’s jurisdictional grant 
carries with it the power to independently determine applicable 
state law? There are two possibilities. Corbin might believe that 
any grant of jurisdictional inherently carries with it the authority to 
make law. Alternatively, he might believe that the authority to 
make law derives from certain rights of litigants. The latter 
possibility is more likely. Although he does not elaborate on the 
basis of the authority of federal courts to make law, Corbin argues 
that it derives from the right of litigants to have the law applied to 
their case not depend on the forum in which their case is brought. 
 
1.  The Inference to Judicial Lawmaking: Traditional 
and Modern Views 
     Traditionally, the power to independently determine law is 
viewed as incident to a grant of jurisdiction.185 According to this 
view, a grant of jurisdiction to a court also gives it the authority to 
select law needed to resolve the case before the court, unless the 
applicable law is selected by a competent authority other than the 
court. The authority to decide cases and the authority to determine 
law are distinct sorts of authority.  Jurisdiction and judicial power 
need not go together. However, the traditional view is that, unless 
restricted, once a court has jurisdiction it has the power to select 
law. The justification for finding judicial power incident to 
jurisdiction is necessity.186 When a competent authority has not 
otherwise selected applicable law, a court exercising jurisdiction 
cannot decide the case before it unless it selects law. Deciding the 
case therefore requires the power to select law needed to reach a 
decision.   
Today the traditional view of the connection between 
jurisdiction and judicial power would be put in different terms. The 
view sets a default rule of interpretation allowing an inference of 
the court’s authority to select law from the grant to it of 
jurisdiction, unless law is selected by an authority other than the 
                                                
185 For a description of the traditional view, see Hill, supra note 176, at 439. See 
also infra notes 186, 189. 
186 See, e.g., Robert von Moschzisker, The Common Law and Our Federal 
Jurisprudence, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 117 (1925); Frank J. Goodnow, Social 
Reform and the Constitution 183-84 (1911). Cf. Arthur G. Powell, The 
Constitutional Convention and Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. L. J. 862, 862-63 
(1938) (“No accepted definition of the ‘judicial power’ has ever excluded the 
notion that the judge is to ascertain, declare and construe and apply the 
applicable law. A judge without these powers lacks much of being a judge in 
any fair sense.”). 
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court. Likewise, contemporary descriptions of the judicial power 
depict the capacity as the judicial power to make law by selecting 
it. Early nineteenth century courts described the power differently, 
as the capacity to find or determine law.187 Correspondingly, they 
debated the existence or extent of judicial power as one about the 
authority of courts to declare common law.188 However described, 
the traditional view was held by early nineteenth courts and 
continued to be the view of some early twentieth century 
commentators.189 It is evident in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Article III’s admiralty clause, when the Court 
states that “[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction . . . comes the application 
of substantive admiralty law. Absent a relevant statute, the general 
maritime law, as developed by the judiciary, applies.”190 The view 
implicitly also is at work in the Court’s conclusion, based on 
Article III’s grant of jurisdiction to federal courts, that Congress 
has lawmaking power in admiralty matters.191      
The more modern view of the connection between 
jurisdiction and lawmaking authority relies on history. Unlike the 
traditional view, the more modern view therefore does not infer 
lawmaking authority from jurisdiction. It instead determines the 
judicial power of federal courts by the historical purposes for 
which jurisdiction was granted.192 Applied to Article III, the view 
finds the judicial authority to make law in the purpose for which 
the framers of the Constitution gave federal courts jurisdiction over 
a particular matter. Thus, for example, the framers’ apparently 
                                                
187
 See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 
1815-1835 118 (1988). 
188 Id. 
189
 See id. at 138-39, 142-43; see also Cook, Federal Courts and the Conflict of 
Laws, supra note 104, at 520, reprinted in THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 104, at 142-43 (both describing Marshall court’s 
view); von Moschzisker; supra note 186, at 117; Goodnow, supra note 176, at 
183-184; Henry Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law 
in State and Federal Courts, 4 IL. L. REV. 533, 538 (1910). Cf. Keeffe et al., 
supra note 137, at 497 (“Given jurisdiction, it would logically follow that a 
federal court would have the constitutional power to determine the controversy 
by any reasonable method.”). 
190 See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 
864 (1986); see also White, supra note 166, at 445; see generally Ernest Young, 
Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 279-84 (1999). 
191 See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385 (1924); cf. Butler v. Boston 
S.S., 130 U.S. 527, 557 (1888). 
192 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
693, 703-04 (1974); David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The 
Devil’s Own Mess,” 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 158, 163. 
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intended to develop a uniform admiralty law by establishing 
admiralty jurisdiction. It justifies an inference of judicial 
lawmaking authority from the Article III’s grant of admiralty 
jurisdiction.193 On the other hand, the framers’ apparent reason for 
creating diversity jurisdiction was only to avoid local bias against 
nonresident litigants. This purpose is not served by giving federal 
courts the authority to make independent determinations of state 
law. Because lawmaking authority is set by intent, the more 
modern view rejects an inference of lawmaking authority just from 
Article III’s jurisdictional grants. The framers’ different purposes 
in granting jurisdiction under Article III have been disputed. 
Crosskey thinks that they created diversity jurisdiction in order to 
allow for the creation of a body of uniform law in diversity 
cases.194 Justice Pitney, dissenting in Jensen, thinks the framers 
established admiralty jurisdiction to avoid local prejudice against 
nonresident litigants. While disputing the intended purpose behind 
the respective jurisdictional grants, both share the more modern 
view that lawmaking authority is based on this intent.  
Case law does not divide neatly between the traditional and 
more modern views, and it does not show a historical progression 
in views. Although in determining lawmaking authority in 
admiralty courts, rely mostly on historical purpose, and opinions 
often mix both views.195 The apparent intent of framers to create a 
uniform admiralty law, the absence of state law addressing a 
matter, and the presence of admiralty jurisdiction are different 
considerations that all favor the authority of federal courts to create 
admiralty law. Further, courts do not consistently invoke one of the 
views across Article III’s heads of jurisdiction. For example, in 
determining judicial lawmaking authority when jurisdiction is 
founded on “[c]ontroversies between two or more States,”196 the 
Supreme Court has not relied on historical purpose. Rather, it 
infers the authority to make federal common law from the grant of 
jurisdiction.197 The same inference is made when the same issue 
                                                
193 See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 158 (1920); The 
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 564 (1875). In Jensen, Justice Pitney in dissent shares 
the majority’s more modern view of the lawmaking power of federal courts 
while disputing the purpose the intent attributed to the framers by the majority. 
See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 234 (Pitney, J., dissenting). For the Court’s recent 
endorsement of the view that admiralty jurisdiction gives lawmaking power, see 
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23 (2004). 
194 See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 161, at 646. 
195 See Hart, Relations, supra note 150, at 531. 
196 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
197 See, e.g., Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1961); Hinderlider v. 
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arises from Article III’s establishment of jurisdiction based on 
controversies to which the federal government is a party.198 Finally, 
sometimes it not even clear that judicial lawmaking is based on 
Article III’s jurisdictional grant or merely on a Congressional 
statute. Only in the former case is the issue of the judicial authority 
to make federal common law controversial. Nonetheless, even 
acknowledging these complications, the traditional and more 
modern views identify recognizable inferences in the case law.  
 
2. The Right to Forum-Neutral Law 
Corbin sometimes merely asserts that federal courts have 
lawmaking authority without  identifying the source of that 
authority.199 At other points Corbin finds the authority in Article 
III. In The Laws of the Several States, he does so in arguing that 
federal courts in diversity cases have a duty to independently 
determine applicable law.200 The argument is: Article III’s 
jurisdictional grant allows federal courts to decide diversity cases 
but specifies neither the law applicable to them nor the sources 
they must use to determine that law. Litigants are entitled to have 
their rights not depend on the forum in which they are 
established.201 Because federal courts must decide diversity cases 
before them and the litigants have this entitlement, Article III’s 
jurisdictional grant authorizes federal courts to independently 
determine the law applicable to these cases. The litigants’ rights 
not to have their entitlements turn on the choice of forum require 
federal courts to independently determine applicable law. Thus, 
when the applicable law is state law, federal courts must use “all 
the juristic data that are available to the state court.”202 Article III’s 
jurisdictional grant gives federal courts the constitutional power to 
determine applicable law in diversity cases without deference to 
state court interpretations of state law. Their duty to exercise this 
jurisdiction by independently determining applicable law derives 
from litigants’ rights not to have their entitlements turn on the 
                                                                                                         
LaPlata River & Cherry Creek, 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); see also Hill, supra 
note 168, at 439 (describing the relevant decisional law generally). 
198 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). 
199 See, e.g., Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 92, at 
1353. 
200 See Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 774-75. 
201 Id. at 771 (federal court’s “sworn duty to administer justice as it would be 
administered in the state court . . . .”); id. at 775 (precluding federal courts from 
deciding state law based on all sources available to state courts is a “denial of 
justice to those for whom a court exists.”). 
202 Id. at 774. The argument in the text appears in id. at 773. 
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choice of forum.   
This argument infers the authority to make law from a 
jurisdictional grant. Nothing in it turns on finding the historical 
purpose behind Article III’s grant of diversity jurisdiction. The 
inference to the authority to independently determine applicable 
law follows directly from a grant of jurisdiction (the duty to 
exercise judicial authority to select law without being bound by 
state court determinations turns on litigants’ rights––another 
nonhistorical fact). Thus, the argument adopts the traditional view 
of jurisdiction and judicial power. Corbin’s reliance on the 
traditional view is consistent with his rejection of originalism as a 
method of constitutional interpretation, noted above.203 If 
constitutional interpretation should not be guided by the meaning 
either the framers or contemporary readers attached to 
constitutional provisions, inferences drawn from Article III’s 
jurisdictional grant also should not be similarly guided. Further, 
the argument makes the authority to independently determine law 
turn on particular types of law. Jurisdiction gives the federal court 
this authority, whether the applicable law is federal or state. Corbin 
therefore rejects both Swift’s and Erie’s results. Swift permits 
federal courts to determine matters of “general” commercial law 
without deference to state court interpretations of them.204 
Subsequent case law relying on Swift does not require deference 
when general principles of law or matters deemed “general” and 
not “local” were at issue.205 Swift and subsequent cases require 
federal courts to follow the decisions of state courts where 
“nongeneral” state law matters were concerned. Erie requires that 
federal courts follow state supreme court interpretations of state 
law, whether “general” or “local.” Corbin’s argument authorizes 
federal courts to independently determine applicable law whenever 
they have jurisdiction in a diversity case. Whether the applicable 
law is state or federal does not affect their authority to determine it.                          
Corbin uses the argument to respond to Holmes and 
Brandeis’s charge that his position involves an “unconstitutional 
                                                
203 See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
204 See Swift at, 18 (matters of law merchant not controlled by local statute or 
“ancient local usage”). 
205 See Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner–Diversity Jurisdiction and the 
Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1301 
(2000); Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 
1026-27 (1953) (rationale of cases to the effect that “general law” is state law); 
Charles A. Heckman, Uniform Commercial Law in the Nineteenth Century 
Federal Courts: The Decline and Abuse of the Swift Doctrine, 27 EMORY L. J. 
45, 48 (1978). 
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assumption of power.”206 Although neither makes explicit the basis 
of the charge, their likely criticism is that the refusal to defer to 
state supreme court determinations of state law does not respect the 
state’s allocation of lawmaking authority to its supreme court.207 In 
independently determining state law, federal courts 
unconstitutionally exercise the state supreme court’s lawmaking 
power. Corbin’s response is in two parts. First, he concedes that in 
reaching decisions federal courts make law but points out that the 
same is true whatever result they reach.208 His apparent thought is 
that the fact that they make law therefore cannot constitutionally 
restrict the federal courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. Second, Article 
III’s jurisdictional grant gives federal courts the authority to 
independently determine state law. Thus, even if a state’s 
constitution allows its highest court to make state law, federal 
courts have constitutional power to determine state law without 
being bound to a state court’s interpretation of state law. Corbin’s 
reasoning here is worth quoting: “[i]t is very difficult to see any 
‘unconstitutional assumption of power’ when the federal court 
decides a case over which the Constitution expressly gives it 
jurisdiction and determines as best it may, from such sources as it 
can find, what the ‘law’ is by which the rights of the litigant are 
determined.”209 This can fairly be read to say that federal courts 
have the constitutional power to independently determine the law 
applicable in cases in which Article III gives them jurisdiction. The 
reasoning infers the authority to independently determine law from 
Article III’s jurisdictional grant. In his 1938 note on Erie, Corbin 
asserted the conclusion of this reasoning: “[i]n the cases that are 
rightly before them, the federal courts have the same constitutional 
power, as have the Pennsylvania courts, of determining the law 
that is applicable to the instant case.”210   
My purpose in noticing Corbin’s response is biographical, 
not critical. The response does not deny the charge that exercising 
such authority might interfere with a state’s allocation of 
lawmaking powers to its courts. Corbin does not even try to argue 
                                                
206 Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 773; Black & White Taxicab Co., 
276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes); Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (Brandeis). 
207 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Cf. Hart, Relations, supra note 
150, at 512; Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie–The Thread, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1685 (1974). 
208 Corbin, The Demise of  Swift v. Tyson, supra note 87, at 1353; Corbin, 
Several States, supra note 69, at 773. 
209 Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 773. 
210 Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 92, at 1353. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss1/4
2010] Before the Jurisprudential Turn 
 
133 
that no interference occurs when a federal court refuses to follow a 
state supreme court’s opinion on state law. He considers it enough 
to argue that Article III’s jurisdictional grant gives federal court the 
authority to independently determine applicable law. The response 
shows that he takes the inference from jurisdiction to lawmaking 
authority to be self-evident–as it is on the traditional view 
described above. Swift’s defenders sometimes found in Article III’s 
jurisdictional grant the authority of federal courts to independently 
determine general law.211 On matters of local law, however, they 
conceded that federal courts were bound to state judicial 
expositions of state law. Corbin’s view is different. While holding 
that Article III’s jurisdictional grant authorizes federal courts to 
independently determine applicable law, he denies that general law 
exists.212 Corbin therefore finds that the jurisdictional grant 
authorizes federal courts to exercise independent judgment with 
respect to both federal and state law. He simply infers the authority 
to independently determine state law from a grant of jurisdiction.  
A further question is whether Corbin has available better 
responses to Holmes and Brandeis’s charge. For instance, Corbin 
could have argued that litigants have an (unspecified) 
constitutional right to have a court decide their entitlements in a 
manner unaffected by the forum in which the case is brought. This 
right, he could have concluded, is more important than the 
constitutional demand that federal courts respect state lawmaking 
functions. Alternatively, Corbin could have disputed the 
assumption that an independent determination of state law fails to 
respect a state’s allocation of lawmaking powers. Respect, instead, 
only requires that a federal court use the same sources as state 
courts use to reach decisions in similar cases. Corbin believes that 
state courts have available to them the range of sources from state 
states and state court opinions, legal commentary and even the 
conventional local practices. In light of these sources, state law 
precedent, binding on both state and federal courts, does not 
compel a result in subsequent cases.213 Use of these to determine 
state law sources–what Corbin called “persuasive data” —does not 
prevent a federal court from concluding that a state court 
interpretation of state law does not accurately reflect state law. 
Again, my biographical point is that Corbin thinks his response 
                                                
211 See, e.g., von Moscheisker, supra note 176, at 117; Chamberlain, supra note 
109, at 277; Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision–More on the 
Erie Case, 30 KY. L. REV. 3, 18 (1941). 
212 See supra notes 96, 97 and accompanying text. 
213 See Corbin, Several States, supra note 69, at 771-72. 
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answers the charge that his position involves an “unconstitutional 
assumption of powers.” He does not feel the need to argue that 
rejecting federal court deference refuses to respect a state’s 
allocation of lawmaking authority. Because the response infers the 
constitutional authority to independently determine law from a 
jurisdictional grant, Corbin must therefore have found the 
inference decisive. He therefore thinks that Article III’s grant of 
jurisdiction ultimately gives federal courts the constitutional power 
not to follow state supreme court opinions.214                                   
 
 CONCLUSION 
The understanding of Erie in the 1940s and 1950s was very 
different from today’s description of the case’s rationale. Today 
the case is taken to rest, at least in part, on jurisprudential grounds 
about the nature of law: a commitment to legal positivism.215 
Contemporary commentators and courts could not have disagreed 
more. They dismissed Erie’s reliance on jurisprudential 
considerations.216 Instead, the case was defended and attacked on 
constitutional grounds. This assessment was consistent with earlier 
defenses of Swift, which also rested on constitutional grounds, not 
jurisprudential ones.217 Corbin’s opposition to Erie, based only on 
practical and constitutional considerations, therefore is typical, not 
idiosyncratic.  
Justice Frankfurter’s description of Erie in York, decided in 
1945, appears to have been one of the first attempts to rest Erie’s 
result on a particular conception of a law.218 But even the dissent in 
                                                
214 The inference is not idiosyncratic; for the same inference, see Powell, supra 
note 165, at 862-63. Robert Jackson, then Solicitor General, in an article 
published four months after Erie was decided, recognized the plausibility of the 
inference: “[i]f the constitutional issue had been argued [in Erie], the Court 
would have had to consider the interesting question whether its decision 
undermines the foundations of the rule of uniformity in maritime law, which 
also depends on a simple grant of jurisdiction to the Federal Courts in the 
Constitution.” Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 
AMER. BAR ASSOC. L. J. 609, 644 (1938) (footnote omitted). 
215 See supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra note 185; Broh-Kahn, supra note 211, at 18. 
217 See supra note 196; Chamberlain, supra note 116, at 274-82; FREYER, supra 
note 10, at 46, 53-56, 71-74. 
218 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; for a closely contemporary 
criticism of Erie sharing Frankfurter’s assumption that the case rests on a 
conception of law, see John J. Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect: An 
Analysis of Its Proper Area and Limits, 35 A.B.A. J. 19, 21 (1949). Frankfurter’s 
views seem to have changed between Erie and York. In the term before Erie was 
decided, he set as a final examination question for his federal courts course the 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss1/4
2010] Before the Jurisprudential Turn 
 
135 
York denied Erie’s jurisprudential commitments.219 Taken as a 
whole, the evidence suggests that Frankfurter’s understanding of 
Erie in 1945 was novel and did not predominate. It suggests that 
both contemporary supporters and critics of the decision 
understood the case in broadly constitutional terms, not 
jurisprudential ones bearing on the nature of law. Do the various 
drafts of Article III’s “judicial power” clause considered by the 
1787 Constitutional Convention suggest that the framers intended 
to give federal courts the authority to independently determine 
state law? Is the phrase “laws of the several states” in the Section 
34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act equivalent in meaning to the phrase 
“Statute law of the several states . . . and their unwritten or 
common law” that appeared in an earlier draft of the Section? Will 
Erie’s requirement of federal court deference impair the supposed 
tendency of federal court interpretations of common law to spur 
uniformity in state law? These questions engaged commentators, 
not questions about  
the nature of law.      
A good measure of the contemporary understanding of Erie 
is the analysis of the case given in predominant mid-twentieth 
century casebooks on federal courts. Casebooks whose authors 
described Erie focused on constitutional considerations, to the 
exclusion of jurisprudential concerns. To be sure, the authors of 
contemporary casebooks generally did not say a lot about the cases 
they reprinted. Federal courts casebooks of the time adopted a 
hands- off editorial style and did not analyze the cases they 
reproduced, which typically included Swift and Erie.220 Editorial 
intervention was minimal, usually limited to a string citation of 
secondary literature in footnotes added to the reprinted cases. 
However, the first edition of Hart’s and Wechslers’ The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System,221 published in 1953, is a notable 
                                                                                                         
task of criticizing Swift based on “historical, juristic, and functional 
considerations.” Quoted in Mary Brigit McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The 
Architect of “Our Federalism,” 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 754-55 (1993). 
Significantly, Frankfurter did not ask about the jurisprudential basis of Swift. 
The omission suggests that he did not consider the case to rest on a conception 
of law rejected by Erie—the position he takes in York. 
219 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. 
220 See, e.g., CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & JAMES H. CHADBOURN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS (2d ed. 1950); RAY FORRESTER, DOBIE AND 
LADD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (2d 
ed. (1950). 
221 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953) [hereinafter, HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
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and influential exception. It contains a series of notes and 
questions appearing immediately before Erie is reprinted. Hart and 
Wechsler there present the “principle” of Swift and reproduce 
Holmes’s criticism of the case in his dissent in Black & White 
Taxicab Co.222 In the excerpt, Holmes attributes to Swift the view 
that the common law is something independent of the decisions of 
state courts—“outside” of them.223 Hart and Wechsler follow the 
excerpt with three questions: “Does this go to the jugular of the 
problem? Is it necessary to accept this theory of law to justify a 
rejection of Swift v. Tyson? Is it likely that state provisions 
adopting the common law were premised on this theory?”224 The 
questions easily invite negative answers and reveal the authors’ 
view that Swift can be rejected without adopting a particular view 
about the nature of law. Adopting a theory about the nature of law 
does not address the “jugular” of the problem, according to the 
answer Hart and Wechslers’ first question invites. Rather, 
according to questions in their earlier notes, Swift violates an 
(unspecified) constitutional requirement that applicable law not 
vary with the forum in which litigation proceeds.225 In the oblique 
pedagogical style of mid-century casebooks, Hart and Wechsler 
intimate their understanding of Swift and Erie by questions, not 
assertions or arguments. However, their questions obviously 
suggest that Swift and its overruling by Erie are grounded in 
constitutional, not jurisprudential, concerns.226  
A final historical question is whether jurisprudential views 
about the nature of law somehow predisposed Brandeis and like-
minded courts to reach Erie’s result. Did a belief in legal 
positivism incline courts to find that federal courts generally must 
defer to the determinations of state law as found by the state’s 
highest court? Because a commitment to natural law, which 
conditions legal norms on morality or rationality,227 could have the 
same effect, the question must be whether courts committed to 
legal positivism would be more likely to demand federal court 
                                                                                                         
COURTS]. For an example of the very favorable assessment of the casebook on 
its publication, see Philip Kurland, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 906, 907 
(1954) (at time of writing the “definitive text on the subject”). 
222 HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, at 619-20. 
223 Id. at 620; see supra notes 37, 96 and accompanying text. 
224 Id. at 620. 
225 Id. at 616. 
226 Hart and Wechsler therefore do not share the dedicatee of the first edition of 
their casebook and author of York’s understanding of Erie.   
227 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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deference than courts committed to natural law.228 It is hard to see 
why. For endorsement of legal positivism to influence a court’s 
beliefs about deference, two things must be true: views about the 
nature of law must require federal court deference to state court 
determinations of state law, and legal positivism and natural law 
must require different degrees of deference. Without the former 
condition, legal positivism has nothing to say about federal court 
deference. Without the latter condition, competing conceptions of 
law may demand the same degree of deference as positivism 
demands.  
Neither condition seems likely to be met. Because 
conceptions of law by themselves say nothing about what 
constitutes state law, legal positivism does not dictate whether 
articulations of state law by the state’s highest court constitutes 
state law. The status of state decisional law is itself a matter of 
state law, not settled by jurisprudential considerations about the 
nature of law. States could consider state legislation to be state law 
and judicial interpretations of such legislation merely evidence of 
state law.229 In that case federal courts would not be compelled to 
defer to determinations of state law by state courts. Further, the 
appropriate degree of deference federal courts must show state 
courts is a matter of constitutional law, broadly understood. It is 
not dictated by a view about whether state decisional law 
constitutes state law. Even if legal positivism somehow required 
particular deference to state decisional law, nothing prevents its 
jurisprudential competitors such as natural law from requiring the 
same degree of deference. Thus, only psychological or cultural 
factors unrelated to jurisprudential considerations may have 
predisposed courts to endorse Erie’s result.        
 
 
                                                
228 For a similar question about the propensity of conceptions of law to influence 
judicial responses to the demands of evil regimes, see Liam Murphy, The 
Political Question of the Concept of Law, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 371 (Jules L. 
Coleman ed. 2001); David Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: 
South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy (1991); Hart, 
Positivism, supra note 55, at 593. 
229 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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